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Abstract
This Comment argues that, given the consumer dependence on trademarks to distinguish be-
tween goods of varying quality, the ECJ made the correct holding in Ideal Standard. This Com-
ment also argues, however, that the Court should have expressly limited its holding to trademarks,
distinguishing them from other forms of intellectual property. Part I presents the historical back-
ground that underlies the conflict between national trademark rights and the Free Movement of
Goods principle within the European Union. Part II discusses the ECJ’s doctrines before Ideal
Standard, which attempted to reconcile this conflict, and examines the Ideal Standard modifica-
tion of the consent doctrine based on control. Part III argues that, although the Court’s principle
of control is a thoughtful and practical way to delineate national trademark rights, it should have
distinguished between the unique nature of trademarks from other intellectual properties. This
Comment concludes that, while the ECJ impliedly recognized the distinct nature of trademarks
in Ideal Standard, it should expressly state this distinction in order to provide clear guidance for
companies and legal practitioners.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern commercialization and international use' of
corporate trademarks' has recently triggered increased recogni-
tion of national trademark rights in the European Union
("EU").' Traditionally, the European Union has been reluctant
1. See Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial Transac-
tions, 10 SPG ENT. & SPORTS LAW 5, 5 (1992). The increasing pace of new trade agree-
ments is resulting in the increased internationalization of trademarks. Id. As goods
and services bearing trademarks flow more freely between nations, trademarks assume a
global role. Id. Approximately half of the trademark applications filed in the Member
States of the European Union are from foreign companies. Robert Rice, How to Make
Your Mark in a Single Market, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at 2.
Moreover, the EU Member States are responsible for almost half of the world's
national registered trademarks. See id. (noting that more than 3 million trademarks are
registered in European Union, with various Member State trademark offices receiving
almost 400,000 new applications each year); Frances Williams, New Trademark Treaty
Agreed, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1994, at I (citing estimate of 7 million total trademarks
registered worldwide with national trademark authorities).
2. See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw 27
(1991). The authors define a trademark as "a word, design, or a combination of them,
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from
others." Id. Trademarks have also been characterized as "legal monopolies for the ex-
ploitation of words or symbols in conjunction with specified products or services, Usu-
ally in perpetuity." GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 396 (1993).
The Council of Ministers, the European Union's chief legislative body, has also put
forth a definition:
A trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically,
particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the
shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.
Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC, art. 2, O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1988).
3. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended y Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). Until 1995, the twelve EU Member States were
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. TEU, supra, pmbl. On January 1,
1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became Member States of the European Union. See
Hugh Carney, Sweden Gives Clear Yes to EU Vote in Favour of Membership Keeps Enlargement
Timetable on Course, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at 1 (discussing accession of new states).
The enlarged Union does not include Norway, which rejected membership in the
Union in November 1994. John Darton, Vote in Norway Blocks Joining Europe's Union,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
See IHT Internazionale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal Standard GmbH, Case 9/93,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 [hereinafter Ideal Standard] (recognizing
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to recognize national trademark rights because national trade-
mark laws, as well as laws dealing with other forms of intellectual
property,4 may conflict with the European Union's economic
priority- of maintaining the free movement of goods ("Free
Movement of Goods") 5 between EU Member States. 6 This con-
flict exists because enforcing trademark rights may entail block-
ing the importation of goods that carry an infringing trade-
mark.7 During the past three decades, the European Court of
importance of national trademark rights in holding that trademark proprietor does not
relinquish rights by assigning trademark).
4. See ARTHUR W. WELL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAw 5 (1917). The author defines
intellectual property as "those property rights which result from the physical manifesta-
tion of original thought." Id. It has also been defined as "a general name for property
(such as patents, trademarks, and copyright material) which is the product of invention
or creativity, and which does not exist in a tangible, physical form." XIV. NEw OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1068 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OXFORD].
5. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. The Treaty pro-
vides that:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set
out therein:
(c) an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Mem-
ber States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital;
Id.; see alio BERMANN, supra note 2, at 317. The authors express the importance of the
Free Movement of Goods principle as follows:
Within the "four freedoms" [the free movement of goods, persons, serv-
ices, and capital], the free movement of goods is undoubtably the key concept.
Not only is the free flow of commercial and industrial products throughout
the Community the most tangible illustration of an integrated market, but the
principles that have been elaborated in this field have significantly shaped
those applicable to the free movement of persons, services and capital.
Id.
6. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, Title 1, arts. 9-37, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-606
(detailing rules of Free Movement of Goods). The European Court of Justice has de-
cided that maintaining free trade between Member States, through enforcement of the
Free Movement of Goods principle, may justify limiting national intellectual property
rights. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Grossmarktee GmbH
& Co., Case 78/70, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (stating that Free Move-
ment of Goods principle may limit national copyrights); Centrafarm BV and Adriaan
DePeijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] C.M.L.R. 480
(applying Free Movement of Goods rules to limit national patent rights); Van Zuylen
Freres v. HagA.G., Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 [hereinafter
Hag 1] (holding that national trademark rights are subject to limitation due to Free
Movement of Goods).
7. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 744, 1 11, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 143. "The
exercise of trade mark rights tends to contribute to the partitioning off of the markets
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Justice8 ("ECJ") has attempted to resolve this conflict by formu-
lating a rule that defines the limits of a trademark owner's rights
for the purpose of determining when these rights should be ex-
tinguished in favor of free trade between Member States. 9
The events giving rise to this legal conflict involve the divi-
sion of trademarks among two or more companies. 10 When a
and thus to affect the free movement of goods between Member States." Id. In Cen-
trafarm v. Winthrop, the ECJ stated that "[a]n obstacle to the free movement of goods
may arise out of... national legislation concerning industrial and commercial property
.... Centrafarm BV and Adriaan DePeijper v. Winthrop, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R.
1183, 1194, 9, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, 508-09. The Court explained that such intellec-
tual property laws "can prevent importation of the product into [the intellectual prop-
erty owner's] own Member State where it has been marketed in another Member
State." Id.
8. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684. The ECJ ensures
that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the EC Treaty. Id. In
serving this function, the ECJ maintains jurisdiction over Member States and EU institu-
tions. See id. arts. 169, 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87 (providing for jurisdiction over
Member States); id. art. 173, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687-88 (stating that ECJ may review
acts of Council and EC Commission).
9. See, e.g., Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC
Commission, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (ap-
plying EC Treaty competition rules, which prohibit certain restraints of trade, to limit
exercise but not existence of intellectual property rights); Deutsche Grammophon, [1971]
II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (stating that Treaty protects only "specific subject
matter" of national intellectual property rights which conflict with free trade); Hoff-
mann-LaRoche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer
Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 102/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (declaring
that Free Movement of Goods principle may limit national trademark rights but that
courts must consider trademark's "essential function"); SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. Hag GF
AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 [hereinafter Hag II]
(holding that trademark proprietor's lack of consent to division of trademark permits it
to retain national trademark rights despite Free Movement of Goods conflict); Ideal
Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (holding that, because assign-
ment of trademark does not constitute consent within meaning of Hag II, Free Move-
ment of Goods principle does not impede assignor's national intellectual property
rights).
10. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127. In Hag I, the ECJ
applied Free Movement of Goods rules to address the involuntary division of trade-
marks resulting from wartime sequestration of a company in an enemy nation. Id.
Division of a trademark can also occur when multiple subsidiaries register a trade-
mark in various countries, or when a company licenses or assigns its trademark to one
or more independent parties in other territories, thereby creating multiple trademarks.
See Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (considering facts in
which German electronics producer had its trademark registered in various EU Mem-
ber States, thereby dividing the original trademark); Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l. and
Others, Case 40/70, [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260 (addressing U.S. firm's as-
signment of its trademark to Italian company, and its subsequent licensing of that trade-
mark to German firm). Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
480 (ruling on trademark rights of company that had voluntarily divided its trademark
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trademark divides, a company that owns a registered trademark
in one Member State may encounter another company that sub-
sequently acquired use of that trademark in another Member
State. 1 The latter company, or a parallel importer,'2 may seek
to introduce its identically trademarked products back into the
original Member State. 3 This presents unwanted competition
for the original proprietor of the trademark.1 4 Consequently,
the original proprietor may choose to file a national trademark
infringement action, based on the trademark laws of its Member
State, in an attempt to keep the identically marked products out
among multiple subsidiaries); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing multiple trademarks created through subsidiaries of one com-
pany).
11. See, e.g., HagL [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127. In Hag I, the ECJ
addressed a situation in which a trademark divided without the voluntary consent of the
original trademark owner. Id. The involuntary sequestration of German enemy prop-
erty following World War II resulted in a company's trademark being used in Belgium
by one party and in Germany by another. Id. Involuntary division can also occur if a
national government requires by law that a party license its intellectual property right.
See Pharmon BVv. Hoechst AG, Case 19/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2281, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775
(stating that compulsory licensing of patent does not constitute voluntary consent to
circulation of patent).
Voluntary division of a trademark occurs if a firm distributes its trademark among
its international subsidiaries, or distributors, for registration of the trademark in various
Member States. See, e.g., Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418
(addressing facts in which German manufacturer authorized its distributors in various
Member States to register its trademark in their respective countries); Hoffmann-La-
Roche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing voluntary division of
trademarks through multiple subsidiaries of one company).
12. See BERMANN, supra note 2, at 633. The authors describe parallel imports as a
manufacturer's goods distributed in one nation that flow into another nation where
they compete with that same manufacturer's goods of another distributor. Id.
The Commission has the power to preserve parallel importation because the free
flow of goods is a Treaty mandate. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
590. The Commission's chief function is to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are
applied. Id. art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682.
13. See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 295 (5th ed. 1994). In her Glossary, Korah defines "parallel trade," which is
the practice of parallel importers: "[i]f there are large price differentials between the
member states, not accounted for by differences in cost, such as freight, taxes, etc., it
may pay someone to buy in the low priced area and sell in the high." Id. Korah further
characterizes parallel trade as the "mechanism on which the Commission relies to lead
towards the equalisation of prices throughout the common market." Id.
14. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (addressing circum-
stances under which original trademark proprietor objects to newly imported products
carrying identical mark); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217
(considering importation of marked products into territory of original trademark
owner who objects to competition from identically marked goods).
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of its state.15
The ECJ's recent decision in IHT Internazionale Heiztechnik
GmbH v. Ideal Standard GmbH16 ("Ideal Standard') addressed the
question of whether a trademark proprietor exhausts its national
trademark rights when it assigns'7 its trademark.18 In deciding
earlier cases in which trademarks divided, the ECJ considered
the determinative factor to be whether the original proprietor
15. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (considering issue
originally brought as infringement action in Benelux courts); Hoffmann-LaRoche,
[1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing infringement action initially
brought before Landgericht Freiberg, German national court).
See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. According to the
reference procedure as set out in Article 177, a national court may refer a question
regarding the interpretation of the Treaty to the ECJ if the court considers it necessary
to decide the case. Id. The national court is obligated to raise such a question if its
decision is not appealable to any other national tribunal. Id. Art. 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity and of the ECB;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court ofJustice to give a
ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
Id.
16. [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C;M.L.R. 857.
17. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. Assign-
ments are defined as follows:
The act of transferring to another all or part of one's property, interests, or
rights. A transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real
or personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein. It
includes transfers of all kinds of property .... The transfer by a party of all of
its rights to some kind of property, usually intangible property ....
Id.
18. Id. at 1-2838, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 902. When a company assigns its mark along
with the sale of part of its business, it seeks to ensure that its remaining operations will
not be threatened by the importation, back into its home territory, of substandard
products carrying the assigned mark. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, IHT
Internazionale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal Standard GmbH, Case 9/93, [1994] E.C.R.
1-2793, 1-2815, 85, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 861, 883 (citing IS GmbH's contention regard-
ing ability of trademark owner to freely assign its mark, without fear of substandard
imports carrying mark).
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consented to the division of its trademark. 9 In Ideal Standard,
however, the ECJ ruled that, despite the proprietor's apparent
consent to an assignment,20 the proprietor had not exhausted its
national trademark rights.21 This ruling modified the ECJ's
prior stance by adding the requirement of proprietor control for
exhaustion of trademark rights,22 thereby granting national
trademark owners additional protection. 3
This Comment argues that, given the consumer depen-
dence on trademarks to distinguish between goods of varying
quality, the ECJ made the correct holding in Ideal Standard. This
Comment also argues, however, that the 'Court should have ex-
pressly limited its holding to trademarks, distinguishing them
from other forms of intellectual property. Part I presents the
historical background that underlies the conflict between na-
tional trademark rights and the Free Movement of Goods princi-
ple within the European Union. Part II discusses the ECJ's doc-
trines before Ideal Standard, which attempted to reconcile this
conflict, and examines the Ideal Standard modification of the
consent doctrine based on control. Part III argues that,
although the Court's principle of control is a thoughtful and
19. See Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (emphasizing trade-
mark proprietor's lack of consent to division of mark). Where consent is absent, the
trademark owner retains its national trademark rights. Id. Where consent does exist,
the proprietor should, theoretically, accept responsibility for its trademark having come
back into its territory. Id. In this case it has exhausted its national trademark rights. See
Guy Tritton, Articles 30 to 36 and Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudence of the ECJ now of an
Ideal Standard?, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 422, 424 (1994) (stating that with Hag I
decision, consent doctrine "must be considered a cast-iron rule of law"). See also Cen-
trafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (holding that company
exhausts national trademark rights once it has consented to placing products into circu-
lation one time).
20. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2793, 4, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 862 (reciting facts wherein trademark proprietor's sub-
sidiary voluntarily assigned its trademark to independent French company). See also id.
at 1-2820, 1 102, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 887-88. Advocate General Gulmann stated that
"[a] trade mark proprietor who concludes a separate assignment for certain Member
States has voluntarily relinquished the right to be the only one to market on Commu-
nity territory products bearing the mark in question." Id.
21. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909.
22. Id.; see Ideal Standard, [1994], E.C.R. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909
(stating that "power [of controlling quality] is lost if, by assignment, control over the
trademark is surrendered to a third party having no economic link with the assignor").
23. Id.; see Contributed Article by Linklaters on Trademarks, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY
REP., July 15, 1994, at 2 (observing that with Ideal Standard decision "the ECJ has ex-
tended the limits of a trademark owner's rights considerably").
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practical way to delineate national trademark rights, it should
have distinguished between the unique nature of trademarks
from other intellectual properties. This Comment concludes
that, while the ECJ impliedly recognized the distinct nature of
trademarks in Ideal Standard, it should expressly state this distinc-
tion in order to provide clear guidance for companies and legal
practitioners.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EUROPE, AND
THE EU INSTITUTIONS
The Ideal Standard case pits national intellectual property
rights against the European Union's Free Movement of Goods
requirement, 24 two principles with divergent historical back-
grounds.25 European nations have enforced intellectual prop-
erty rights since the Middle Ages.26 The European Union, on
the other hand, traces its roots to the 1950's.
28
24. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857.
25. Compare Beryle R. Jones, An Introduction to the European Economic Community and
Intellectual Properties, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 665 (1992) (noting existence of intellectual
property rights in Europe as early as 1235 A.D.) with JOHN SPANIER, AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 35 (8th ed. 1980) (describing European integration as new
means of exerting control over Germany's growing power in 1950's).
26. See BRUCE BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw 18-
19 (1967) (observing that first intellectual property patent in 1421 gave birth to patent
institution of today); W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADE-MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS § 9.001, 9.002 (2nd ed. 1989) (recalling that early
publishers' pleas for exclusive rights in printed works in sixteenth century led to estab-
lishment of intellectual property copyright law); FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 19-38 (1925) (describing how
trademarks originated during Middle Ages as means of identifying source of products).
27. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591. Article 5 requires
Member States to sacrafice some of their autonomy:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any message which could jeopardize the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
28. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). See SPANIER, supra note 25, at 35-47.
The author, after recounting the chaotic conditions sending "Europe on the verge of
collapse," observes that:
The failure of the traditional balance-of-power technique, by which an inferior
power had always sought to balance a stronger nation, led France to seek a
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A. Intellectual Property in Europe
Intellectual property signifies a group of rights deriving
from invention, creativity, or some other form of original
thought.2 9 National governments grant to inventors the exclu-
sive right to their creations, sometimes over a fixed period of
years.3 0 Some scholars characterize intellectual property rights
as legal monopolies,3' because such newly-created works may be
new way of exerting some control over Germany's growing power. French
statesmen found an imaginative means in European integration. It was
through the creation of a supranatural Community, to which Germany could
transfer sovereign rights ....
France made its first move in this direction of a united Europe in May
1950, when Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the plan that has
since borne his name: European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
The EC institutions, then, were the embryo of a united Europe.
Id. at 35, 44-45, 47.
29. WEIL, supra note 4, at 5; X1V OXFORD, supra note 4, at 1068 (defining intellec-
tual property).
30. See BERMANN, supra note 2, at 396 (giving overview of traditional categories of
intellectual property rights).
31. See DOMINICK SALVATORE, MICROECONOMics 265 (2nd ed. 1994). The author
characterizes a monopoly as a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms
dominate the sales of a product or service. Id. It is also defined as a privilege vested in
one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right to carry on a partic-
ular business or trade, or control the sale of a particular commodity. BLACK'S, supra
note 17, at 1007. The EC Commission, which serves as the executive body of the Euro-
pean Union, defines it in terms of a firm having a dominant position within a given
market to the point where it can price its products regardless of what its competitors
charge. Commission Decision No. 72/21/EEC, J.O. L 7/25, at 35 (1971) (Continental
Can). This power is typically measured by assessing the firm's market power within the
relevant market. See Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v.
Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, 247,1 32, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199, 226 (stating
that relevant market must first be delineated before comparing firm's power with that
of competitors). American courts have used this measurement technique since the
1950's. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(examining market power of company with analysis of market definition and computa-
tion of market share).
Dominant power is unlawful in the European Community if coupled with abusive
practices. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 86, (1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28 ("[any
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket in so far as it may affect trade between Member States"). The legislative body of the
Community has given the executive branch the means to halt such abuses of power. See
Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-1962, at 87
(enabling Commission to enforce Articles 85 and 86 of EC Treaty).
The dual requirement of dominance and abuse originates from opinions written
by some famous American judges, who preferred the terms "monopoly" and "exclusion-
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used only with the consent of their rightholders.32 National gov-
ernments in Europe have recognized several traditional catego-
ries of intellectual property rights, including patents, copyrights,
and trademarks.3 3
1. Patents and Copyrights
Patents grant exclusive rights to inventors for the commer-
ary conduct." See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (Judge Learned Hand holding that monopoly power and exclusive practices vio-
late Sherman Antitrust Act); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (Justice Wil-
liam Douglas declaring that use of monopoly power to exclude competition is unlaw-
ful). In the United States a monopoly combined with exclusionary conduct constitutes
"monopolization," a practice outlawed by the Sherman Antitrust Act. U.S. v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100 (1948); see Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(prohibiting monopolization).
32. See ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTi-
TRUST 11 (1989) (describing practices in sixteenth century England whereby royalty and
parliament granted monopolies to favored individuals in form of intellectual property
rights); BERMANN, supra note 2, at 396 (characterizing various forms of intellectual
property as legal monopolies); Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao, Some Reflections on the
Antitrust Treatment ofIntellectual Property, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 605 (1995) (considering,
in reference to intellectual property, "a monopoly position that is achieved by discover-
ing a scarce input like gold or oil"); Ilene Knable Gatts & Howard W. Fogt, Jr., Clinton
Administration Expresses More Than Intellectual Curiosity in Antitrust Issues Raised by Intellec-
tual Property Licensing, 22 AIPLA QJ. 1, 4 (1994) (stating that U.S. Constitution provides
inventors with limited monopoly for prescribed number of years); David Hurlbut, Fixing
the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT.
RES. J. 379 (1994) (explaining, "the purpose of patents and other intellectual property
is to create monopoly rent for the benefit of those whose inventions may have social
benefit"); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 841, 848 (1993) (referring to "the monopoly
characteristics of intellectual property"); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark
Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, Part , 18 COLUM.-VIA J.L. &
ARTS 1, 2 (1993) (describing "the monopolies of patent and copyright protection");
Preeti Sinha, Special 301: An Effective Tool Against Thailand's Intellectual Property Viola-
tions, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL. J. 281 (1992) (referring to "market monopolies" held by
patent owners).
But see BUGBEE, supra note 26, at 6-7. Bugbee stresses that the definition of intellec-
tual property should not be confused with the meaning of a monopoly. Id. at 6. A
United States Supreme Court opinion contrasts these two concepts: "a monopoly takes
something from the people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it en-
joyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to
the sum of human knowledge." United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 186 (1933).
33. See Jones, supra note 25, at 665 (referring to intellectual property as "a broad
range of rights including copyrights, trademarks, patents, trade secrets, know how,
rights of publicity, and design rights"); BERMANN, supra note 2, at 396 (explaining that
three traditional categories of intellectual property rights recognized by almost all mod-
ern capitalist governments are patents, trademarks and copyrights).
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cial exploitation of their inventions for a fixed period of years.34
Governments grant patents to reward inventors and to provide
an incentive for the manufacture of new works which benefit so-
ciety.3 5 The world's first known patent, granted by the Republic
of Florence to a vessel architect in 1421,16 explicitly articulated
the need for such incentive.3 7 Historians suggest that this early
monopoly represents the birth of the patent institution.3 8 Cur-
rently, an inventor may choose to license his patent to another
34. CORNISH, supra note 26, at 65, § 3.001; KORAH, supra note 13, at 189, § 9.1.
Patents are generally valid for a term of twenty years in the European Union. BERMANN,
supra note 2, at 396.
35. See CORNISH, supra note 26, at 66-67, § 3.003 ("the idea of conferring a market
monopoly as an incentive to innovate has old roots"); KoRAH, supra note 13, at 189,
§ 9.1 ("in order to encourage and reward investment in innovation, the law of most
countries enables inventors or their employers to apply for patents").
36. See BUGBEE, supra note 26, at 17 (noting government of Florence's grant of
patent to architect); FRANK D. PRAGER & GUSTINA SCAGLIA, BRUNELLESCHI: STUDIES OF
His TECHNOLOGY AND INVENTIONS 111-12 (1970) (referring to noted architect Filippo
Brunelleschi as recipient of early Florentine patent for vessel design).
37. See PRAGER & SCAGLIA, supra note 36, at 111-12. The Florentine patent reads:
Considering that the admirable Filippo Brunelleschi, a man of the most
perspicacious intellect, industry and invention, a citizen of Florence, has in-
vented some machine or kind of ship, by means of which he thinks he can
easily, at any time, bring in any merchandise and cargo on the river Arno and
on any other river or water, for less money than usual, and with several other
benefits to merchants and others; and that he refuses to make such machine
available to the public, in order that the fruit of his genius and skill may not be
reaped by another without his consent;.., and that, if he enjoyed some pre-
rogative concerning this, he would open up what he is hiding, and would dis-
close it to all:
And desiring that this matter.., shall be brought to light, to be of profit
both to said Filippo and to our whole country and others; and that some privi-
lege be created for said Filippo, as hereinafter described, so that he may be
animated even more fervently to even higher pursuits, and stimulated to more
subtle investigations ....
Id. See also EUGENIO BATTISTI, BRUNELLESCHi, THE COMPLETE WORK 331 (1981). Brunel-
leschi's patent was for a cargo vessel to be used on the Arno river. Id. The patent lasted
three years, and gave Brunelleschi the right to have burned any ship which copied his.
Id.
38. See PRAGER & SCAGLIA, supra note 36, at 111 (referring to "one of the first pat-
ents of monopoly ever granted to anyone"); BUGBEE, supra note 26, at 18-19. Bugbee
observes:
This [patent] acknowledged the benefit accruing to society from the products
of original thought and affirmed that legal security of such products would
stimulate further creativity by providing incentive. Thus the fundamental
principles underlying intellectual property and its protection were set forth in
this pioneering document, which evidently marks the genesis of the true pat-
ent institution.
Id. See also YvES PLASSERAUD & FRANCOIS SAVIGNON, L'ETAT ET L'INVENTION: HISTOIRE
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manufacturer rather than exploit it directly.3 9 Because inventors
rarely have the financial means to develop their creations for
sale on the market, licensing is a common practice.40
Copyrights grant authors and artists the exclusive right to
reproduce works that traditionally appear in a fixed medium,
such as literature, art, musical compositions, theatrical works,
and cinemographic productions.4 1 Like patents, governments
grant copyrights to encourage the production of new cre-
ations.42 During the sixteenth century, English entrepreneurs,
DES BREVETS (1986). The authors, while referring indirectly to Brunelleschi's patent,
explain how sea trade spurred inventions that expanded into other areas:
In this cosmopolitan sphere, entrepreneurial and always moving, the in-
ventors were, so to speak, like fish in water. Indeed, this arena, or, more par-
ticularly, this aquatic milieu, was the major preoccupation of most of the in-
ventors: dikes, floodgates, water pumps and other water management devices
were their preferred domain. After 1421, the year in which, according to the
foremost historian on the subject, was given the first privilege resembling an
exclusive right to an invention, the practice perfected itself rapidly as it ex-
panded into new domains: a privilege was granted to a Frenchman for a grain
mill in 1443, then to numerous others for watermills and windmills, for fulling
cloth, and for striking metal.
Id. (Author's translation from the French text).
39. See BLACK'S, supra note 17, at 919-20. A license is defined as "[p]ermission to
do a particular thing, to exercise a certain privilege or to carry on a particular business
or to pursue a certain occupation." Id. A patent license is defined as "[a] written au-
thority granted by the owner of a patent to another person empowering the latter to
make or use the patented article for a limited period or in a limited territory. A permis-
sion to make, use, or sell articles embodying invention." Id. at 920. Valentine Korah
defines a patent license as permission to do what would otherwise infringe a patent.
KORA-, supra note 13, at 295.
40. See KoRmm, supra note 13, at 208, § 10.1 (noting that "[a]n individual inventor
can rarely raise the capital to finance the development of his ideas and set up produc-
tion").
41. See CORNISH, supra note 26, at 258, § 9.023 ("[s] tarting from the production of
books, it has moved out into the modem media of instruction and entertainment -
through stage performances to recordings and broadcasting"). In the European
Union, copyrightable works also include computer software, under legislation establish-
ing guidelines and a timetable for the Member States to revise their copyright laws
accordingly. Council Directive No. 91/250, OJ. L 122/42 (1991).
In the United States copyrightable works of authorship include works of: litera-
ture, music, drama, choreographic works and pantomimes, graphic and sculptural de-
pictions, motion pictures, sound recordings and architectural renderings. Copyright
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A 1980 Amendment to the Act
provides for protection of computer software. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)). A copyright is generally valid for a term of at least fifty years. BERMANN, supra
note 2, at 396.
42. See CORNISH, supra note 26, at 245-46, §§ 9.001-9.002 (describing English roots
of modern copyright protection).
1996] IDEAL STANDARD V IHT 1191
calling themselves stationers,43 organized the printing and sale
of newly-created works.4" In order to protect their large invest-
ments in production, the stationers sought from the English
Crown exclusive rights to reproduce authors' works.45 The sta-
tioners' efforts led to the enactment, in 1709, of the Statute of
Anne. 46 The English Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne to
provide incentive for the commercial exploitation of written
works.4 7 It was the first statute specifically outlining authors'
rights,4" and is widely regarded as the basis for modem copyright
law. 49 Today, the European Union recognizes both copyrights
43. See id. at 245, § 9.001. Predecessors to the modem publisher, stationers bore
the principle risk in producing authors' works because of their large investment in pro-
duction. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 246, § 9.002; British Statutes at Large, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1764), at 82. The
statute, also known as the Copyright Act of 1709, was passed during the reign of Queen
Anne. CORNISH, supra note 26, at 246, § 9.002.
47. See British Statutes at Large, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1764), at 82.
Like the Brunelleschi patent, the Statute of Anne evokes the need to provide in-
centive to creative minds:
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently
taken the liberty of printing, reprinting and publishing.., books and other
writings without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and
writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and
their families: for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for
the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful Books; may it
please your Majesty, that it may be enacted... that.., the author of any book
or books.., shall have the sole right and liberty of printing such book and
books for the term of one and twenty years ....
Id.
48. Id.; ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (4th ed. 1993) (observing that Statute of Anne was "the first
statute of all time specifically to recognize the rights of authors").
49. See GoRMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 48, at 2 ("This law was.., the foundation
of all subsequent legislation on the subject of copyright"); BUGBEE, supra note 26, at 49
(emphasizing influence of British copyright law as "the most influential of the world's
copyright systems" and remarking that "its essential completion in the eighteenth cen-
tury heralded the age of modern copyright law"); Aoki, supra note 32, at 73 (character-
izing Statute of Anne as "the first modem copyright law"); Michael B. Reddy, The Droit
de Suit: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 Lov. EN'r. L.J.
509, 534 (1995) (stating that Statute of Anne served as model for U.S. Constitution's
copyright provision); Irah Doner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why did the
Framers Include it With Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 373 (1992) (cit-
ing recommendation of American Constitutional Congress that states enact laws based
on Statute of Anne, and noting resulting similarities of state statutes to Statute of
Anne); Kristina Rosette, Note, Back to the Future: How Federal Courts Create a Federal Com-
mon-Law Copyright Through Permanent Injunctions Protecting Future Works, 2 J. INTELL.
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and patents as forms of intellectual property protected under
the EC Treaty.50
2. Trademarks
Trademarks grant parties the exclusive and perpetual5
right to use a mark or name to identify a product or service. 2
PROP. L. 325, 337 (1994) (describing Statute of Anne as having caused "dramatic trans-
formation").
But see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literay Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REv. 991, 991-92 (1990). The author explains that the
French copyright system developed apart from the Anglo-model:
The French and U.S. systems are well-known as opposites. The product of the
French Revolution, French copyright law is said to enshrine the author: exclu-
sive rights flow from one's (preferred) status as a creator. For example, a lead-
ing French copyright scholar states that one of the "fundamental ideas" of the
revolutionary copyright laws .is the principle that "an exclusive right is con-
ferred on authors because their property is the most justified since it flows
from their intellectual creation. By contrast, the U.S. Constitution's copyright
clause, echoing the English Statute of Anne, makes the public's interest equal,
if not superior, to the author's. This clause authorizes the establishment of
exclusive rights of authors as a means to maximize production of and access to
intellectual creations.
Id.
50. See Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft fur Musikalische Auf-
fuhrungs- und Mechanische Vervielfaltigungsrechte (GEMA), Cases 55 & 57/80, [1981]
E.C.R. 147, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44 (interpreting phrase "industrial and commercial prop-
erty," in Article 36 of EC Treaty, as including copyrights); Centrafarm v. Sterling,,
[1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] C.M.L.R. 480 (recognizing patents as "protected industrial
property").
51. See GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 28 (explaining that trademark rights continue
indefinitely as long as trademark neither is abandoned nor loses its trademark signifi-
cance by becoming generic term); BERMANN, supra note 2, at 396 (stating that trade-
marks generally grant rights "in perpetuity").
52. See GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 27 ("[a] trademark is a word, design, or a combi-
nation of them, used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distin-
guish them from others"); BERMANN, supra note 2, at 396 (defining trademarks as "legal
monopolies for the exploitation of words or symbols in conjunction with specified
products or services, usually in perpetuity"). The Council also defines trademarks in
Article 2 of the 1988 Trademark Directive:
A trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically,
particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the
shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.
Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC, art. 2, O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1988) [hereinafter EC
Trademark Directive].
In the United States, trademarks can protect other seemingly unorthodox charac-
teristics such as sound and odor. See Trademark Registration No. 523,616 (Apr. 4,
1950) (granting trademark protection for to National Broadcasting Corp. for musical
note sequence G-E-C). In reference to a trademark applicant's attempt to register a
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Unlike a patent or copyright, a trademark does not represent a
significant investment in creative effort,5 3 but is simply a name or
label.54 Through their historical development, trademarks have
acquired the dual functions of providing producers with a means
of establishing a positive reputation for their products and al-
lowing consumers to distinguish between products of varying
quality.55
a. Early Development: Trademarks Convey Proprietary Rights
In Europe, trademarks were first used to establish a proprie-
tary right in goods by identifying the source of the product.56
fragrance with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Office's Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board stated, "we believe that applicant has demonstrated that scented fra-
grance does function as a trademark for her thread and embroidery yarn." In Re Clark,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (granting protection for fragrance of yarn and sewing
thread). A Harley-Davidson executive emphasized the importance of trademark protec-
tion for the distinctive sound of a classic engine, stating "[wie are looking to register
the sound of a Harley-Davidson motorcycle - the sound of a V-twin engine with a
single crankpin. We have made engines this way since 1909." Trademark Sought for Roar
of Harley Hog, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 7, 1995, at A6.
53. See United States v. Emil Steffens; United States v. Adolph Wittemen; United
States v. W.W. Johnson, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) [hereinafter Steffens; Wittemen; Johnson].
In the United States, where patent and copyright protection are specifically provided
for-in a Constitutional clause, the Supreme Court has ruled that the clause does not
extend to trademarks because it is meant to protect only those writings and discoveries
resulting from intellectual labor. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Con-
gress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies"). A trademark "does not depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of
the brain." Steffens; Wittemen;Johnson, 100 U.S. at 94. Moreover, it "requires no fancy or
imagination, no genius, no laborious thought." Id. at 94, 550 L.Ed. at 551-52. The U.S.
Congress has since passed the Lanham Act, providing for federal trademark protection
for trademarks used in commerce. 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Congress derives its authority to protect trademarks from the U.S. Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,
cl. 3 ("Congress shall have power .... to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states").
54. See GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 27 (characterizing trademark as "a word, design,
or a combination of them").
55. See id. at 27 (stating that trademarks allow manufacturer to identify source of
goods and help to distinguish different quality goods from one another).
56. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 19. See WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKs AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS 2-12 (2d ed. 1898). Browne de-
scribes the historical use of trademarks as emblems of ownership. Id. at 2. Dating back
to the time of Christ, seals, sign-boards, water marks and engravings were used to indi-
cate origin and convey proprietary rights. Id. at 4-11. Roman literature provides proof
that marks were used even earlier in Europe, with extensive references to the marking
of goods such as wine and cheese. John Burrell, Q.C., Two Hundred Years of English
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One such trademark was the merchant's mark.5 7 During the
Middle Ages,58 merchants used their marks to convey proprie-
tary rights in articles that were lost by shipwreck, piracy, or other
mishap.59 In the fourteenth century, a merchant's mark consti-
tuted conclusive evidence of a proprietary right in the marked
product.60 Swan marks6" represented another type of proprie-
tary right.6 2 Swans were regarded as royal birds in which no sub-
ject could gain a proprietary right without a grant from the Eng-
lish Crown.63 In granting this royal privilege, the King's swan-
keeper would fashion a small particular mark in the beak of the
swan, signifying ownership of the swan by the grantee. 64
Trade Mark Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADE-
MARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 35 (Am. Bar Assoc. ed., 1977). In eastern Asia, Browne
traces trademarks to a much earlier period. See BROWNE, supra, at 11-12. He cites the
use of characters and designs on Chinese pottery as a means of authentication during
the reign of Emperor Hoang-ti at approximately 2700 B.C. Id.
57. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 26. Merchants transporting goods by ship affixed
a unique emblem to their products. Id.
58. IX OXFORD, supra note 4, at 743. The Middle Ages generally refers to the pe-
riod of European history roughly encompassing 1000-1500 A.D. Id. When originally
used by fourteenth century humanists, the term referred to a different period: the
chronological gap between the fourteenth century and the collapse of the Roman Em-
pire. 8 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 308 (Joseph Strayer ed., 1987).
59. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 26. Schechter explains that merchants' trade-
marks appeared on the registry of the ships carrying the goods, as well as on the goods
themselves. Id. The purpose of this practice was to establish a prima facie presumption
of ownership in the goods to protect against loss. Id. See also FREDERICK R. SANBORN,
ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW 317 (1930) (noting
that, in England, "it was enacted that goods coming to land, not being wreck, were to be
delivered to the owners on proof of ownership").
60. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 27; see also SANBORN, supra note 59, at 213 (stating
that merchant's mark "was not a legal proof of ownership, but among the jurists it gave
rise to such a presumption").
61. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 35. A swan mark, used to convey ownership of a
swan, consisted of a simple pattern of small notches engraved in the swan's beak. Id.
62. Id. at 35; BROWNE, supra note 56, at 14.
63. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 35.
64. Id. New swan owners were immediately registered in the royal swan keeper's
book. Id. Trademarks took on an additional significance with the evolution of medie-
val trade guilds, which were groups of craftsmen who formed trading partnerships. Id.
For the trade guilds, trademarks represented, in addition to a proprietary right, a
means of tracing defective products and punishing the offending craftsmen. Id. at 38,
47. Marking one's product was therefore a legally required practice in most trades
throughout Europe. Id. at 38.
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b. Modern Commerce Creates Good-Will Function
of Trademarks
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as trading ex-
panded and goods were transported longer distances, 65 trade-
marks acquired an additional function aside from identifying the
source of products.66 Trademarks became symbols of quality to
consumers who were no longer in close contact with produ-
cers. 67 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England's
681Industrial Revolution" magnified this function of trademarks.69
65. Id. at 129. See CHARLES TILLEY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, A.D.
900-1990, at 49 (1990). The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked an increase in
the number of merchants who linked western European households with distant mar-
kets. Id. Where city-states such as Venice and Genoa once dominated Mediterranean
sea trade, the sixteenth century saw Spain, Portugal, England and Holland enter the
business. Id. at 64. By the next century, these nations had developed extensive trading
routes through the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to reach Asia. Id. at 189; see id. at
93 (referring to "great empires" of Dutch East India and West India trading companies
during seventeenth century); SINNAPAH ARAsARATNAM, MARITIME TRADE, SOCIETY AND
EUROPEAN INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN ASIA 44-45 (1995) (describing European trading
companies' rush to establish factories and fortify settlements along Indian coast in sev-
enteenth century).
66. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 47.
67. Id. at 47, 129.
68. VII OXFORD, supra note 4, at 898. The Industrial Revolution is defined as "the
development which took place in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, chiefly owing to the introduction of new or improved machinery and large-
scale production methods." Id.
69. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 130; see CORNISH, supra note 26, at 400, § 15.013.
Cornish observes:
With the immense growth in the scale of business, and the advertising that
accompanies it, modem customers rarely have that personal knowledge of
suppliers which is the hallmark of a village economy .... Information about
origin is only a means towards an end: their main concern is in the quality of
what they are buying.
Id. See also Burrell, supra note 56, at 42. A legal historian describes why trademarks
increased in importance during the Industrial Revolution:
No longer was trade a mere regional activity. Overnight - or so it seemed
after centuries of unchange - the market for goods suddenly became nation-
wide in a very real sense.... Huge international markets were in the course of
being developed for British exports. This was boom time for England and
boom time for trade marks as well."
Id. While historians agree that a tremendous increase in consumption and advertising
occurred in England during the Industrial Revolution, they differ as to when exactly
this occurred. Compare PAT HUDSON, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 173-75 (1992) (cit-
ing view that, in latter half of eighteenth century, rising incomes and emphasis on verti-
cal social mobility sparked "consumer revolution") with N.E.R. CRAFTS, BRITISH Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 112 (1985) (stating that personal
consumption increased significantly only after 1820).
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Consumers continue to view trademarks as primarily a guar-
antee of quality.7° This quality guaranty is known as good-will. 71
Because of good-will, trademarks today constitute valuable assets
for many corporations, 2 are expressly recognized on corporate
balance sheets, 73 and are used as collateral in international lend-
Despite consumers' emphasis on the quality of goods represented by a trademark,
English Courts continued to view trademarks as exclusively a proprietary right.
SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 19, 147; see CORNISH, supra note 26, at 394, § 15.003 ("the
good-will at risk was easily characterised as 'property' ").
70. SCHECHTER, supra note 26, at 147. Schechter states that it is therefore highly
questionable to view a trademark chiefly as a proprietary right meant to indicate origin.
Id. at 38. See GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 37 (noting that "consumer confusion remains
the foundation of the legal protection of trademarks").
71. See THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 73, § 2:8 (2d
ed. 1984). Goodwill comprises consumers' positive perceptions about a trademark. Id.
This perception is based on consumers' assumptions that the product or service repre-
sented by the trademark will meet a certain standard of quality. Id.; see Brian W.
Peterman, Note, The Gray Market Solution: An Allocation of Economic Rights, 28 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 159, 171 (1993) (stating that trademark's good-will flows from quality of product).
In the United States, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of good-
will. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, writing for the Court, explained that the true significance of a trademark is not
its indication of the origin of goods, but rather its indication of the business goodwill of
the trademark owner. Id; see also Steven P. Kersher & Donald S. Stein, Judicial Construc-
tion of Section 526 and the Importation of Grey Market Goods: From Total Exclusion to Unim-
peded Entry, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 251 (1986). The authors noted another
aspect of trademarks illuminated in Bourois v. Katzel: "With Holmes' analysis, the
Supreme Court adopted the territoriality principle, recognizing that a trademark had a
separate legal existence under each country's laws." Id.
72. See Simensky, supra note 1, at 6. Some trademarks represent as much as 80
percent of the value of a company. Id. at 5. In the cigarette industry, the Marlboro
trademark has been valued at US$40 billion worldwide. Id.
Many existing trademarks have high values partly because of the difficulty that new
companies have in establishing good-will. Id. The high cost of launching new brand
names, and an 80 percent failure rate for such campaigns, increases the value of those
trademarks which are already established. Id.
In the retail sector, the goodwill value of a trademark may also be based on current
trends. See Alan Gathright, Outlaw Club Turns to the Law Over Name; Hell's Angels Sue
Marvel Comics Over Trademark, SAN DIEGO UNION-TiB., Jan. 24, 1993, at A3 (observing,
"biker chic has turned leather jackets, Harley-Davidson hogs and other rebel icons into
gold"). The Hell's Angels Motorcycle Corporation, whose members flaunt black
leather jackets and a free-spirited lifestyle, owns U.S. trademarks for the "Hell's Angels"
name and its death-head insignia. Id. Pursuant to a trademark infringement suit
against Marvel Comics, Hell's Angels noted that the publicity surrounding the mere
appearance of their trademark in a Marvel Comics publication increased the retail
value of the issue from US$1.75 to US$10. Id.
73. See Simensky, supra note 1, at 6. The increased commercial value of intellec-
tual property assets, such as world famous trademarks, has driven companies in the
United Kingdom to frequently restate the value of these assets on their balance sheets.
Id. The development of quantifiable methods of valuing intellectual property in the
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ing transactions. 4
B. The European Union and Its Institutions
In 1951, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg created the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity ("ECSC") 7 5 for the purpose of regulating production 76 and
promoting free trade7 7 in the coal and steel industries.78 The
ECSC led to the signing of a pact calling for political and eco-
nomic integration among the six ECSC Member States. 79 This
agreement, termed the Treaty of Rome,8 ° established the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("EEC").8 In the name of free
trade and European political solidarity,82 Member States relin-
UK has further encouraged the exploitation of these assets. Id. Moreover, British ac-
countants maintain that, unlike tangible assets, intellectual property assets generally do
not depreciate over time. Id.
74. See id. at 8. An example of one such global lending transaction involved two
banks, one in the United States and the other in the United Kingdom. Id. Together
they loaned more than US$500 million to a multinational corporation based in Europe.
Id. As security, the lenders sought to collateralize the corporation's worldwide trade-
marks. Id. In many countries, however, the laws do not explicitly recognize security
interests in trademarks. Id.; see David C. Rose, Note, Searching for the Comfort Zone: Issues
Related to the Perfection of Security Interests in Trademarks in International Commercial Transac-
tions, 15 U. PA. J. INT. Bus. L. 137 (1994) (observing that "[i]n the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom, the taking of security interests in trademarks is com-
plicated by uncertainty").
75. ECSC Treaty, supra note 28, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
76. See ECSC Treaty, supra note art. 2, at 145 (establishing goal of maintaining
optimum productivity through creation of common market).
77. See id. art. 4(a), at 147 (prohibiting duties and quantitative restrictions on
movement of coal and steel).
78. See SPANIER, supra note 25, at 35-47 (recalling social and political motivations
for establishing integration of Western European nations); JOHN GILLINGHAM, COAL,
STEEL, AND THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE 157 (1991). Gillingham explains that the French
people wanted to ensure that the German post-war recovery would not outpace that of
France. GILLINGHAM, supra, at 157. Such assurance could be obtained by the creation
of an international board which would allocate the production of coal and steel, which
were strong German industries. Id.
79. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1. See BER-
MANN, supra note 2, at 5-6 (describing ECSC as first stage of European economic and
political integration); GILLINGHAM, supra note 78, at xi (referring to "the integration
that grew out of the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community").
80. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (setting
forth term "Treaty of Rome").
81. Id.
82. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, Pmbl., [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 587-88 (declaring that
common action be taken among Member States to "eliminate the barriers which divide
Europe"); see also GILLINOHAM, supra note 78, at xii (citing cooperative diplomacy as
reason for success of European integration following World War II).
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quished national sovereignty in areas covered by the Treaty of
Rome. 3 The Treaty of Rome also established several govern-
mental institutions: the European Commission, 4 the Council of
Ministers,85 the European Parliament, 6 and the ECJ.87
83. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591. Article 5 states
that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any message which could jeopardize the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
84. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682 (delineating
Commission functions regarding enforcement of EU policy and introduction of EU
legislative proposals). See also A.G. TOTH, THE OxFoRD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 70 (1990) (hereinafter ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAw]. Toth states that
[T] he Commission is chiefly a decision-making body whose main powers lie in
the field of initiating, implementing, and enforcing legislation, while the ac-
tual decision-making is primarily carried out by the Council.
Id.
85. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80. The func-
tions of the Council are broadly listed:
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Coun-
cil shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
- ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member
States
- have the power to take decisions;
- confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers
for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down.... The
Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly imple-
menting powers itself.
Id. See also BERMANN, supra note 2, at 51 (stating that Council exercises primary legisla-
tive power in European Union).
86. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 138b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 677. The European
Parliament is chiefly a legislative body. Id. Under the TEU, Parliament can participate
in forming EU legislation:
In so far as provided in this Treaty, the European Parliament shall participate
in the process leading up to the adoption of Community acts by exercising its
powers under the procedures laid down in Articles 189b and 189c and by giv-
ing its assent or delivering advisory opinions. The European Parliament may,
acting by a majority of its members, request the Commission to submit any
appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is
required for the purpose of implementing this Treaty.
Id.
87. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 164-87, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-91. The ECJ
acts as the judicial branch of the European Union. See id. (detailing jurisdiction and
composition of European Court of Justice).
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1. The European Commission
The European Commission ("Commission") serves as the
executive body of the European Union.8" As such, the Commis-
sion primarily ensures that Member States properly implement
the EC Treaty89 through the introduction and enforcement of
EC legislation.90 Furthermore, the Commission, whose mem-
bers are required to be completely independent of Member
State interests, 91 may bring an action before the ECJ if it consid-
ers that a Member State has not fulfilled an EC Treaty require-
ment.
92
88. See id. art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682. The Article provides the Commission
with tasks commonly identified with the executive branch:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the com-
mon market, the Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the
institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with
in this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it
necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of meas-
ures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner
provided for in this Treaty;
- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implemen-
tation of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id.
89. See id. (providing that in order to ensure proper functioning and development
of common market, Commission shall firstly "ensure that the provisions of this Treat),
and the measures taken by the institutions thereto are applied").
90. Id. art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682. See TOTH, supra note 84, at 70 (describ-
ing legislative proposal and enforcement roles of Commission). The Commission pro-
poses EU legislation, which is then passed on to the Council of Ministers for delibera-
tion and reformulation. DAVID MEDHURST, A Bm R AND PRAcrIcAL GUIDE TO EC LAw 20
(1994). The legislation, if passed by the Council, goes back to the Commission for
implementation. Id.
91. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 157, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-83 (requiring
that members of the Commission be "completely independent in the performance of
their duties"); see also MEDHURST, supra note 90, at 19 (explaining that Commission
consists of civil servants representing EU interests rather than Member State interests).
92. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686. Article 169 pro-
vides that.
.If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the pe-
riod laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
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2. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers ("Council"), made up of repre-
sentatives from each Member State,93 acts as the European
Union's principle legislative body.94 A primary responsibility of
the Council is to harmonize divergent national laws that affect
the common market.95 The Council harmonizes national laws
by issuing directives,96 requiring Member States to revise their
laws according to specific guidelines.97
93. See id. art. 146, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680 (providing that "[t]he Council shall
consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorized to com-
mit the government of that Member State"), MEDHURST, supra note 90, at 18. A Mem-
ber State has its choice of which Minister it will use to represent its interests:
Thus, if it were discussing agriculture it would be a meeting of agriculture
ministers; if economics a meeting of economics ministers, and so on.
Id. But see TOTH, supra note 84, at 136. The author notes:
Although the Council consists of 'representatives' of the Member States who
invariably represent national interests, it is a Community institution, not an
intergovernmental conference.
Id.
94. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80 (describing
lawmaking function of Council); see also MEDHURST, supra note 90, at 18 (stating that
Council "is as near as the Community comes to a legislative body"); TOTH, supra note
84, at 138-39 (observing that "Council is the main-decision making body" and "is re-
sponsible for giving general political direction to the Community").
95. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80. The Treaty
states that the Council is to "ensure coordination of the general economic policies of
the Member States." Id.
96. See id. art. 100, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633. Article 100 states that:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establish-
ment of the common market.
Id.
97. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 189, O.J. C 224/1, at 65 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R.
at 693-94. This Maastricht provision explains how, apart from other legislation, direc-
tives leave it to Member States to decide how the required policy will be implemented:
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States. A directive shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. A
decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
Id.
See also BERMANN, supra note 2, at 52. For the enactment of a directive or other
legislation, the requisite amount of votes depends upon the matter being considered.
Id. While unanimity is required for matters such as the accession of new states, a simple
majority vote will suffice in other instances. Id.
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3. The European Parliament
The European Parliament ("Parliament") consists of repre-
sentatives of the populations of the various Member States.98
The Parliament acts as an additional legislative body, safeguard-
ing the political interests99 of EU Member State citizens.10 °
Although Parliament exercised chiefly an advisory power under
the EEC Treaty,10 1 its power expanded under the Maastricht
Harmonization of laws may also be achieved through the enactment of Commu-
nity-wide laws, which require an EU regulation or convention among the Member
States. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 220, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711 (stating that
"Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with
a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the protection of persons and
the enjoyment and protection of rights"); see also BERMANN, supra note 2, at 422 (noting
two legislative solutions to problem of divergent national laws).
98. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 137, OJ. C 224/1, at 55 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 676. The Maastricht provision reads, "[t]he European Parliament, which shall con-
sist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community,
shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty." Id. Article 138 continues,
"[tihe European Parliament shall draw up proposals for election by direct universal
suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States." Id. art. 138,
OJ. C 224/1, at 56 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676.
99. See BERMANN, supra note 2, at 63. While the Commission acts as the executive
and as an enforcement mechanism for integration, and the Council as an intergovern-
mental legislature, "the Parliament was to express the political sentiments of the Mem-
ber State populations." Id.
100. SeeTEU, supra note 3, art. 138a, OJ. C 224/1, at56 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 676-77. The European Parliament was meant to express the political will of citizens
of the Member States:
Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration
within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to
expressing the political will of citizens of the Union.
Id.
101. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 137, 298 U.N.T.S. at 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1, at 1. The Article, which has been amended by the TEU, provided, "[t]he Euro-
pean Parliament, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States
brought together in the Community, shall exercise the advisory and supervisory powers
which are conferred upon it by this Treaty." Id. See also MEDHURST, supra note 3, at 17
(stating that the Parliament "does not deserve to be called a Parliament because it
neither proposes nor makes laws: the Commission proposes legislation, and the Council
makes laws"). But cf Donald Macrae, Institutional and Decision-Making Changes, in LEGAL.
ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 175 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds.,
1994). Despite the Parliament's slow growth in power, it has always retained some im..
portant powers which have helped it to exert influence. Id. It has the ability, for exam-
ple, to expel the Commission upon a motion of censure. See id. (describing Parlia-
ment's power to "sack the entire Commission"); see EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 144,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679. The provision states, "[i]f the motion of censure is carried by
a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the members of the
European Parliament, the members of the Commission shall resign as a body." Id.
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Treaty. 112  Parliament's new powers include, for example, the
ability to review both EC legislation passed by the Council"°3 and
proposed EU external agreements. 10 4
4. The ECJ
The ECJ represents the judicial branch of the European
Union.'0 5 It consists of fifteen Judges1 0 6 and nine Advocates
102. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 137, O.J. C 224/1, at 55 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 676. Where Article 137 of the EC Treaty provided for "advisory and supervisory"
powers, the amended Article 137 omits this language. Id. Article 137 now states, "[t]he
European Parliament, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States
brought together in the Community, shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty." Id. See also Macrae, supra note 101, at 174 (noting that changes related to
Parliament "are perhaps best encapsulated in the amendment to Article 137").
In addition, Article 189 now provides for Parliament's participation in enacting
legislation:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council and the Com-
mission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make rec-
ommendations or deliver opinions ....
TEU, supra note 3, art. 189, O.J. C 224/1, at 65 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
Article 189b gives the Parliament the final word in passing legislation:
1. Where reference is made in this Treaty to this Article for the adoption of an
act, the following procedure shall apply.
2. The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and
the Council.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the
European Parliament, shall adopt a common position ....
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament:
(c) indicates, by an absolute majority of its component members, that it in-
tends to reject the common position, it shall immediately inform the Coun-
cil .... The European Parliament shall thereafter either confirm, by an abso-
lute majority of its component members, its rejection of the common position,
in which event the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted, or
propose amendments ....
Id. art. 189b, O.J. C 224/1, at 66 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694.
103. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 189b, OJ. C 224/1, at 66 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 694-95 (providing Parliament with option to reject Council legislation).
104. See id. art. 228, O.J. C 224/1, at 77 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 714 (stating
that international agreements with other states "shall be concluded after the assent of
the European Parliament is obtained").
105. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 164-87, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 684-91 (detail-
ingjurisdiction and composition of ECJ).
106. Facsimile from Armi Frisk, Information Office, Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities, Luxembourg (Mar. 19, 1996). FifteenJudges, one from each EU
Member State, serve on the Court: G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, President (Spain); C.N.
Kakouris, President of Chambers IV and VI (Greece); D.A.O. Edward, President of
Chambers I and V (the United Kingdom); J.P. Puissochet, President of Chamber III
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General.1"7 When disputes arise as to whether a certain act by a
Member State is proscribed by the EC Treaty, the ECJ has juris-
diction to rule on the matter.'08 In the absence of legislative
measures to the contrary, national governments retain their in-
dependence in areas where the EC Treaty is silent. 109
(France); G. Hirsch, President of Chamber II (Germany); G.F. Mancini (Italy); F.A.
Schockweiler (Luxembourg);J.C. Moitinho de Almeida (Portugal); P.J.G. Kapteyn (the
Netherlands); C. Gulmann (Denmark); J.L. Murray (Ireland); P. Jann (Austria); H.
Ragnemaim (Sweden); L. Sev6n (Finland); M. Wathelet (Belgium). Id. The main du-
ties of the President of the Court are to direct the judicial business and administration
of the Court and to preside at hearings and deliberations. TOTH, supra note 84, at 213.
Before the accession of Austria, Sweden, and Finland as Member States of the Eu-
ropean Union, 13 Judges served on the ECJ. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 165,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684 (providing for 13Judges); see also EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
167, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685 (providing for six-year terms of Judges, and election by
Judges of ECJ President serving three-year term).
107. Frisk, supra note 106. The nine Advocates General are: G. Tesauro, First Ad-
vocate General (Italy); C.O. Lenz (Germany); F.G. Jacobs (the United Kingdom); A.M.
La Pergola (Italy); G. Cosmas (Greece); P. Leger (France); M.B. Elmer (Denmark); N.
Fennelly (Ireland); D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer (Spain). Id. The Clerk of the Court is R.
Grass, a Frenchman. Id. Before the accession of the three new EU Member States, the
EC Treaty provided for six Advocates General. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 166,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685. The role of the Advocates General is described as follows:
The Court of Justice shall be assisted by six Advocates-General.
It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete imparti-
ality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on
cases brought before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the Court in the
performance of the task assigned to it in Article 164.
Id. See also ToTH, supra note 84, at 213. In fulfilling the primary task of delivering
opinions for each case brought before the Court, the Advocates-General represent
neither the interests of the parties to the case nor EU interests. Id.
Article 167 requires that both the Judges and the Advocates-General possess com-
plete independence and the qualifications necessary for appointment to the highest
judicial offices in their own countries. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 167, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 685; see BERMANN, supra note 2, at 69 (noting that independence is ex-
pected "particularly in regard to pressures coming from Member States").
108. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 169, 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87
(describing jurisdiction of ECJ over actions by Commission or Member State in case of
Member State's failure to fulfill Treaty obligations).
109. See id. art. 3(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. The Treaty provision reads, in
pertinent part:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
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II. EC TREATY PROVISIONS, THE ECJ'S DOCTRINES, AND
THE IDEAL STANDARD CASE
When the ECJ considers to what extent it will limit national
intellectual property rights in deference to the Free Movement
of Goods principle, it looks first to the EC Treaty,110 which ad-
dresses both intellectual property and free trade.' Because the
EC Treaty does not give precise limits on national intellectual
property rights,' 1 2 the Court has formulated several doctrines,
which interpret the EC Treaty in order to draw such limits."1
Over the last thirty years, the ECJ has revised and supplemented
these doctrines to gradually expand the rights of national intel-
lectual property owners.1 14 In the Ideal Standard case, the ECJ
further extends the rights of trademark proprietors by holding
110. See id. art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684. The EC Treaty established the ECJ
for the purpose of interpreting its provisions. Id. The Treaty states, "[tihe Court of
Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is
observed." Id.
111. See id. arts. 9-37, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-606 (detailing Free Movement of
Goods and mentioning national intellectual property rights).
112. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605. The only provi-
sion of the Treaty which explicitly addresses intellectual property rights, Article 36
reads:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 [relating to the requirement of free move-
ment of goods between Member States] shall not preclude ... the protection
of industrial and commercial property.
Id.
113. See, e.g., Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (hold-
ing that EC Treaty limits exercise, but not existence, of national intellectual property
rights); Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (stating that
Treaty protects "specific subject matter" of national intellectual property rights which
conflict with free trade); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217
(declaring that courts must consider trademark's "essential function" when determin-
ing whether Free Movement of Goods limits national trademark rights); Hag II, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990) 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (holding that, because trademark proprietor did
not consent to division of trademark, it retained national trademark rights despite con-
flict with Free Movement of Goods).
114. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (re-
citing existence-exercise doctrine articulated in Consten and Grundig, and adding that
intellectual property owners may protect "specific subject matter" of property right de-
spite conflict with Free Movement of Goods); Centrafarm BV v. American Home Prod-
ucts Corp., Case 3/78, [1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 [hereinafter Cen-
trafarm v. AHP] (expanding rights of trademark owners by stating that, in addition to
specific subject matter, consumer-oriented "essential function" of trademarks must be
considered when contemplating limiting national trademark rights); Hag 11, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3.C.M.L.R. 571 (overruling Hag I in.holding that, because trade-
mark owner did not consent to division of trademark, it retained national trademark
rights).
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that a national trademark owner does not exhaust its rights when
it assigns its trademark."'
A. EC Treaty Provisions on the Free Movement of Goods and on
National Intellectual Property Rights
The EC Treaty thoroughly outlines the Free Movement of
Goods principle." 6 The EC Treaty refers only briefly, however,
to national intellectual property rights. 117  Consequently, the
ECJ has interpreted the limits of national intellectual property
rights based on implications within the EC Treaty.'18 When na-
tional intellectual property laws conflict with the goals of the Eu-
ropean Union, such as the principle of Free Movement of
Goods, the ECJ develops legal doctrines to define appropriate
limits for national intellectual property.1 9 In developing these
115. Compare Sirena v. Eda, [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R_ 260 (holding that
EC Treaty prevents trademark owners from exercising national trademark rights where
others have acquired trademark through agreement, such as license or assignment)
with Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (holding that EC Treaty
does not prevent trademark owner from exercising national trademark rights where
owner has voluntarily assigned trademark to another party).
116. Compare id. arts. 9-37, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-606 (devoting 29 Articles to
Free Movement of Goods) with id. art. 36, [1992] C.M.L.R. at 605 (containing, in one
article, only express reference to intellectual property rights in EC Treaty).
117. See id. art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605. As noted above, Article 36 is only
provision of the Treaty clearly addressing intellectual property rights. Id. See also id.
art. 222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711 (stating "[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice the
rules in Member States governing the systems of property ownership"); Etablissements
Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64,
[1966] E.C.R. 299, 345 (1966] C.M.L.R. 418, 476 (holding that Article 222 prevents
Treaty from affecting grant of national trademark rights). But see Thomas C. Vine,
Magill: Its Impact on the Information Technology Industry, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. RENv. 397,
398 (1992). Vine points out that the legislative history of Article 222 indicates that it
was intended to have the same meaning as Article 83 of the ECSC Treaty, which does
not relate to intellectual property. Id. Instead, Article 83 was meant to ensure that
ECSC Member States could determine for themselves whether companies were to be
publicly or privately owned. Id. (citing S. Neri & H. Sperl, Traiti Instituant la Com-
munauti Economique Europenne - Travaux priparatoires, Ddclarations intrpratives des six
gouvernements, Documents parlimentaires, Cour dejustice des Communautes Europ6ennes
(1960)).
118. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (in-
terpreting EC Treaty as limiting national copyrights under certain circumstances); Cen-
trafarm v. Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1137, [1974] C.M.L.R. 480 (applying EC Treaty to de-
tail limits of national patent rights); Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127
(holding that national trademark rights are subject to limitation by EC Treaty); see also
BERMANN, supra note 2, at 397 (explaining effect of absence of Treaty definition of
industrial and commercial property rights on ECJ jurisprudence).
119. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (ar-
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doctrines, the ECJ must take the EC Treaty as its point of depar-
ture. 1
20
1. The EC Treaty's Free Movement of Goods Mandate
The Treaty of Rome envisaged economic integration
through the creation of a common market. 21 Paramount in the
achievement of the common market are four freedoms: the free
movement of goods, 12 2 services, 12 3 persons, 24 and capital.125
The EC Treaty deals most extensively with the free movement of
goods. 26
The prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports and
all measures having an equivalent effect, 127 embodied in Articles
30 through 36 of the EC Treaty,128 represents a central compo-
ticulating "specific subject matter" doctrine); Hag , [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 127 (applying principle of "common origin"); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978]
E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (introducing concept of "essential function"); see
also BERmANN, supra note 2, at 409, 421 (reviewing major doctrines laid down by Court
in response to conflicts between national intellectual property rights and EC Treaty
provisions).
120. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684 ("[t]he Court
ofJustice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is
observed").
121. See id. art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (declaring Community shall accom-
plish tasks "by establishing a common market").
122. See id., Tide 1, arts. 9-37, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-606 (encompassing free
movement of goods between Member States). The EC Treaty requires the elimination
of both customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member States. Id.
123. See id. arts. 59-66, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-18 (prohibiting restrictions on
freedom to provide services within European Union). Services include industrial activi-
ties, commercial activities, activities of craftsmen and activities of the professions. Id.
124. See id. arts. 48-58, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612-16 (prohibiting restrictions by
Member States on free movement of workers and right of establishment of persons
other than workers).
125. Id. arts. 73a-73h, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620-23 (outlawing restrictions on move-
ment of capital between Member States and between Member States and third coun-
tries).
126. See id. (devoting as much space to Free Movement of Goods as to other three
freedoms combined).
127. See id. art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions
on imports between Member States and those measures having equivalent effect to such
restrictions).
128. Id. arts. 30-36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602-05. Article 30 proclaims,
"[q] uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall,
without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States."
Id. art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602. Articles 31 to 35 establish a timetable for the
implementation of the restrictions set forth in Article 30. Id. arts. 31-35, [1992] 1
C.ML.R. at 602-04. This timetable no longer applies because the relevant dates have
expired. See id. (referring to past dates).
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nent of the Free Movement of Goods principle. 129 An illustra-
tion of a quantitative restriciton is a quota imposed on imports
from another Member State."' The ECJ has given an expansive
meaning to the term "measures having equivalent effect," 3' and
the phrase includes a Member State's enforcement of its na-
tional intellectual property rights. 3 2 A Member State's recogni-
tion of trademark rights, for example, prevents any party from
importing goods that infringe upon that trademark in the Mem-
ber State. 33 The Member State's enforcement of the trademark
right, therefore, has an effect equivalent to that of a quantitative
restriction." 4 Consequently, the Member State's act is subject to
Article 30,131 which explicitly prohibits measures having such an
effect. 136
129. See BERMANN, supra note 2, at 341 (observing that, with respect to quantitative
restrictions, "the case law is voluminous and the rules developed by the Court ofJustice
are among the core principles of Community law today").
130. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 32, 33, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 603-04 (using
term "quotas" interchangeably with term "quantitative restrictions").
131. Id. art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602.
132. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631
(holding that Article 30 could under certain circumstances preclude use of national
copyrights); Centrafarm v. Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] C.M.L.R. 480 (applying
Articles 30-36 to prohibit firm's use of national patent rights); Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. 731,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (stating that Member State's enforcement of party's national
trademark rights would violate Articles 30-36); see also Council Directive No. 70/50,
J.O. L 13/29, English Spec. Ed., 1970-1 (1969). The Directive details practices that
qualify as measures having an equivalent effect under Article 30:
In particular, it covers those measures which make imports or the disposal, at
any marketing stage, of imported products subject to a condition - other
than a formality - which is required in respect of imported products only, or
a condition differing from that required for domestic products and more diffi-
cult to satisfy. Equally, it covers, in particular, measures which favour domestic
products or grant them a preference, other than an aid, to which conditions
may or may not be attached.
Id. art. 2,J.O. L 13/29, at 18.
133. See e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 744, 1 11, [1974] C.M.L.R. at 143. "The exer-
cise of trade mark rights tends to contribute to the partitioning off of the markets and
thus to affect the free movement of goods between Member States." Id. Centrafarm v.
Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, 1194,19, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, 508-09 (describing how
trademark laws may create obstacle to free movement of goods).
134. See, e.g., Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1195,1 12, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
at 509 (stating that exercise of trademark right is subject to prohibition by Free Move-
ment of Goods rules).
135. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602.
136. Id.
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2. EC Treaty Provisions for Intellectual Property Rights
Despite Article 30's application to a Member State's en-
forcement of intellectual property rights, Article 36 contains an
express right of derogation for the protection of intellectual
property rights.' 37 A national court's finding of trademark in-
fringement by an importer, therefore, does not necessarily vio-
late the EC Treaty. 3 ' The court's decision may be justified as an
act protecting industrial and commercial property rights under
Article 36.' 9
Some jurists also interpret Article 222140 as protecting na-
tional intellectual property rights.141 Article 222 prohibits inter-
pretation of the EC Treaty in a manner that disturbs national
systems of property ownership. 4 2 The ECJ has, however, recog-
nized the limits of Article 222.113
Article 36 also affords only limited national intellectual
137. Id. art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605.
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restric-
tions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing ar-
tistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and com-
mercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, consti-
tute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.
Id. The terms "intellectual property" and "industrial and commercial property" may be
used interchangeably. BERtMANN, supra note 2, at 396. The European Union prefers the
latter. Id.
138. Id. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 743, 7, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 143 (stating
that Article 36 exempts import bans arising out of intellectual property rights); Cen-
trafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1194, 5, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508 (noting that
restrictions on imports are justified if based on protection of industrial or commercial
property).
139. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605.
140. See id. art. 222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711. The brief Article proclaims, "[tihis
Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of
property ownership." Id.
141. See Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R.
299, 365, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418, 447 (stating that impeding "the mere use of a national
industrial property right.., would be contrary to Article 222").
142. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711.
143. See Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 345, [1966] 2 C.M.L.R. at 478 (citing
EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711) (noting that "Articles 36,
222 and 134 of the Treaty... do not oppose every impact of Community law in the
exercise of national industrial property rights .... Article 222 is limited to stating that
the 'Treaty shall in no way prejudice existing systems and incidents of ownership'. ").
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property rights protection.14 4 In its second sentence, Article 36
contains a proviso that prohibits a party from using national in-
tellectual property rights as a disguised restriction on trade be-
tween Member States. 14 5 Consequently, when the ECJ hears an
intellectual property case pursuant to Article 30, Article 36 ap-
plies, and the ECJ must decide whether a Member State's en-
forcement of intellectual property rights is actually a disguised
restriction on trade.1 46 This issue may arise when a trademark
has divided among two or more entities.1 47
To illustrate, assume a party ("T") markets its product in
several Member States and registers its trademark in each coun-
try.14  Due to the varying nature of the national markets, T
product sells at much higher prices in Germany than in Portu-
gal. 149 To take advantage of this situation, a parallel importer
buys T's product at the lower price in Portugal and attempts to
144. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605 (outlining condi-
tions under which intellectual property rights will not be protected).
145. Id. The proviso reads, "[sluch prohibitions or restrictions [on the protection
of intellectual property] shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." Id.
146. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon. [1971] II E.C.R. at 499, 9, [1971] C.M.L.R. at
657 (citing EC Treaty Article 36). The ECJ focused on the proviso to Article 36, observ-
ing that "where certain prohibitions or restrictions on trade between Member States are
conceded in Article 36, the Treaty makes express reference to them, providing that
such derogations shall not constitute 'a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States'." Id. See also Centrafarm v. Sterling, [1974]
E.C.R. at 1162, 7, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503 (interpreting second sentence of Article
36 as limiting exercise of industrial and commercial property rights); Terrapin (Over-
seas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co., Case 119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039,
1060, 4, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R 482, 505 (recognizing that second sentence of Article 36
limits exercise of intellectual property rights); Hoffmann LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. at 1165,
1 10, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 242 ("the exercise of his rights by the proprietor of the trade
mark in order to fetter the free movement of goods beteen Member States may consti-
tute a disguised restriction within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 36 of
the Treaty").
147. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (applying Article 36
proviso to trademarks which had been divided due to wartime enemy property seques-
tration); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing ap-
plication of second sentence of Article 36 to multiple trademarks created through sub-
sidiaries of one company).
148. See, e.g., Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (ad-
dressing situation wherein company created multiple trademarks, in various Member
States, through its European subsidiaries); Centrafarm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1840,
12, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 342-43 (addressing pharmaceutical company's use of national
trademarks in various EU Member States).
149. See George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual
Property Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305, 307
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resell it in Germany to undercut T's high prices in Germany, a
tactic known as selling through the "grey market". 5 ' In order to
prevent this grey market resale in Germany, T invokes German
trademark rights to block the importation. of the identically
marked goods by the parallel importer.15 1 The German court, in
accordance with the EC Treaty and the ECJ, will focus on
whether enforcing T's trademark rights would constitute a dis-
guised restriction on trade between Member States under the
second sentence of Article 36.152
B. Interpreting the Article 36 Proviso: The ECJ's Evolving Doctrines
The ECJ has expanded upon the brief language15 3 of Article
36 in order to decide how intellectual property rights should be
limited.154 Rather than examining the wording of the Article 36
proviso, the ECJ has focused primarily on developing its own
(1993) (observing that prices for particular product may vary greatly within EU Mem-
ber States).
150. See Gonzalez, supra note 149, at 306-07. Grey market goods are produced by
the owner of a particular intellectual property right. Id. at 307. They are not counter-
feit or pirated like black market goods. Id. Generally, a firm purchases these goods
during favorable currency fluctuations. Id. In one particular country, for instance, a
purchaser may buy the goods at a comparatively low price. Id. Parallel importation
occurs when these goods are resold in another country at a price which undercuts the
original owner's price in that country. Id. The gains arising from the price differential
is known as "arbitrage." See Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control
Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 373-74 (1994) (stating
that price differentials incite "arbitrageurs" to buy goods at low prices and resell in
other markets at higher prices).
151. See, e.g., Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (considering action
originally brought in local Benelux courts to prevent parallel importation); Hoffmann-
LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing infringement action,
initially brought before German national court, to block parallel imports).
152. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [19711 II E.C.R. at 499, 9, [1971] C.M.L.R. at
657 (focusing on proviso to Article 36); Gentrafarm v. Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. at 1162, 7,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503 (interpreting Article 36 as limiting exercise of industrial and
commercial property rights); Terrapin v. Terranova, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, 1060, 4,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R 482, 505 (recognizing that Article 36 limits exercise of intellectual
property rights); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. at 1165, 10, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at
242 (stating that exercise of rights by trademark owner, in order to hinder free move-
ment of goods between Member States, may constitute disguised restriction within
meaning of Article 36).
153. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605 (devoting
twenty-one words to proviso).
154. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (articu-
lating "specific subject matter" doctrine without regard for language of Article 36 pro-
viso); Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (departing from wording of
proviso and applying principle of "common origin"); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R.
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doctrines."-' The ECJ's new approach to trademark rights, re-
cently articulated in the Ideal Standard case, 156 represents the
Court's latest attempt to redefine the limits of national intellec-
tual property rights.1 57
The Court's doctrines, including the doctrine established in
Ideal Standard, address situations in which a trademark divides
among several entities.158  These cases can be divided into two
broad groups: voluntary division and involuntary division. 9 A
voluntary division involves a company that has registered its
trademark through its subsidiaries in more than one Member
State, and attempts to exert national trademark rights in one of
the Member States to prevent parallel importation. 160 Involun-
tary division, on the other hand, occurs when a trademark splits
1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (introducing concept of "essential function" without exam-
ining terms of proviso).
155. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [19711 C.M.L.R. 631 (fo-
cusing on specific. object doctrine rather than language of proviso); Hag , [1974]
E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (neglecting to examine language of Article 36 pro-
viso); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (introducing con-
cept of essential function without studying terms of proviso).
156. See Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (holding that,
because assignment does not constitute consent for exhaustion purposes, proprietor's
national rights are not exhausted).
157. See, e.g., Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (apply-
ing EC Treaty competition rules to limit exercise but not existence of intellectual prop-
erty rights); Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (stating that
Treaty protects "specific subject matter" of national intellectual property rights); Hoff-
mann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (declaring that limiting na-
tional trademark rights requires analysis of "essential function" of trademarks); Hag II,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (holding that trademark proprietor's lack
of consent to division of trademark permits it to retain national trademark rights).
158. See, e.g., Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (considering divi-
sion of trademark among two firms due to wartime enemy property sequestration);
Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing multiple
trademarks created through subsidiaries of one company). See supra note 147 and ac-
companying text (explaining application of Article 36 to trademark division).
159. Compare Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (ad-
dressing voluntary division of trademarks) and Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R.
1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (applying specific object concept to voluntary splitting of
trademark rights) with Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (addressing
involuntary splitting of mark) and Hag II, [ 1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571
(analyzing involuntary trademark division).
160. See, e.g., Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480
(holding that company may not benefit from national trademark rights once it has
voluntarily divided trademark among multiple subsidiaries); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978]
E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (addressing application of Free Movement of
Goods principle to multiple trademarks created through subsidiaries of one company).
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (explaining parallel importation).
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without the full consent of its proprietor. 161 The proprietor will
invoke national trademark rights to block any importation of
identically marked products into its territory by the new trade-
mark owner.1 62
1. Voluntary Division
In defining the limits that the Free Movement of Goods
principle places upon national intellectual property rights, the
ECJ determines when an intellectual property proprietor has ex-
hausted its national intellectual property rights. 163 In the 1970's,
the ECJ attempted to establish a standard for deciding when a
party has exhausted its national intellectual property rights. 164
The ECJ's doctrinal evolution originated in 1966 with a distinc-
tion between the existence and the exercise of intellectual prop-
erty rights, 165 which was succeeded by the doctrine of specific
subject matter,1 66 and continued with the principle of essential
function. 167
161. See, e.g., Hag , [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127. Involuntary divi-
sion of a trademark occurred, for example, when the Belgian Government sequestered
German enemy property following World War II, and the German trademark owner
could not prevent his trademark from appearing in Belgium. Id. See also Hag II, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (revisiting facts of Hag1).
162. See, e.g., Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (ruling on trade-
mark proprietor's attempted use of national trademark rights to block imports); Hag II,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (addressing circumstances under which
trademark owner had filed national trademark infringement action to prevent importa-
tion of identically marked products).
163. See Warwick A. Rothnie, Hag II. Putting the Common Origin Doctrine to Sleep, 1
EUR. INTELL. PRop. REV. 24, 25 (1991)(stating that in Deutsche Grammophon "the
Court expounded what has come to be known as the doctrine of exhaustion").
164. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [19711 E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (hold-
ing that once copyright owner has marketed or consented to marketing of product in
another Member State, it may not use national intellectual property rights to block
resulting imports); Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480
(stating that proprietor may benefit from national intellectual property rights only for
purpose of putting products into circulation for first time); Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978]
E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (noting that with respect to trademarks, assessing
exhaustion requires consideration of trademark's essential function).
165. See Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (limiting
exercise but not existence of intellectual property rights).
166. See Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (establish-
ing specific subject matter doctrine).
167. See Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (articulat-
ing essential function of trademarks).
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a. The Existence-Exercise Distinction
In 1966, the ECJ's decision in Consten and Grundig168 began
a brief trend of judgments that limited national intellectual
property rights in favor of free trade.169 Consten and Grundig in-
volved the attempted use of national trademark laws to block
parallel imports. 7 ° Grundig, a German manufacturer of elec-
tronic equipment, authorized its exclusive distributors in various
Member States to register its "GINT" trademark in their respec-
tive countries. 1 Subsequently, the parallel importer UNEF,
having obtained Grundig appliances cheaply from a German
wholesaler, attempted to sell the products in France. 172  Con-
sten, Grundig's exclusive distributor in France, was concerned
that UNEF would undercut its prices and sued UNEF under
French law for infringement of its GINT mark registered in
France. 173
UNEF applied to the Commission for a declaration that
Consten and Grundig had infringed Article 85171 in registering
168. [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
169. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (hold-
ing that Free Movement of Goods principle can limit national copyrights); Centrafarm v.
Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (interpreting Free Movement of
Goods rules as limiting exercise of national patent rights); Hag 1, [1974] E.C.R. 731,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (stating that national trademark rights are subject to limitations
of Free Movement of Goods).
170. Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
171. Id. at 303, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 420.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 303-04, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 420-21.
174. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27. Article 85 pro-
hibits any agreement that restricts competition within the European Union:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
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and using the GINT trademark in France and other Member
States. 175 Article 85 prohibits agreements restricting competi-
tion and affecting trade between Member States. 176 The French
court opted to stay its proceedings until the decision of the Com-
mission. 177 The Commission ruled in favor of UNEF and stated
that Grundig's registration and use of the Gint mark in the vari-
ous Member States violated Article 85.178 When the matter was
referred to the ECJ, the Court supported the Commission's deci-
sion and ruled that Consten's trademark rights could be limited
because Consten and Grundig's partitioning of the European
market through the use of national trademark laws violated Arti-
cle 85 of the EC Treaty.1 79  In response to Consten and
Grundig's contention that Article 222 protected their national
trademark rights,' 80 the ECJ stated that the EC Treaty protects
Id. art. 85(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
175. Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 304, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 421.
176. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
177. Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 304, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 421.
178. Id. Because blocking imports can both impede Free Movement of Goods and
restrict competition between firms within the European Union. the Commission often
has the choice of arguing under either an Article 30 or an Article 85 basis. EC Treaty,
supra note 3, arts. 30, 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602, 626-27. See supra notes 89. 125 and
accompanying text (describing functions of Article 30 and Article 85).
An important procedural distinction, however, is that, under Article 169 of the EC
Treaty, the Commission may bring an Article 30 action only against a Member State.
See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686 (stating that Commission
may bring matter before ECJ if Member State has failed to fulfill Treaty obligation); see
also EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602 (stating that quantitative
restrictions shall be prohibited "between Member States"). The Commission may bring
an Article 85 case, on the other hand, against either a Member State or a private party.
See Commission Regulation No. 17, 1962 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 87 (enabling Commission
to enforce Articles 85 and 86); see also EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 626-27 (prohibiting agreements, by private "undertakings," which restrict
competition). Regulation 17, which is not limited to acts of Member States, empowers
the Commission to enforce Article 85 with respect to any agreement, decision or prac-
tice. Commission Regulation No. 17, supra, art. 2, 1962 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. at 88. Such
an enforcing action by the Commission is termed a "negative clearance." Id. UNEF
sought a negative clearance from the Commission stating that Consten and Grundig
violated the Treaty by agreeing to register the Gint mark in various countries in order
to partition the EU market. Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 304, [1966] C.M.L.R.
at 421. Had the Commission argued under Article 30, it would have needed an act by a
Member State, such as a decision by the French court to enforce Consten's registered
trademark. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602.
179. Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
180. Id. at 344-45, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 475. Because the case was not brought as a
Free Movement violation under Article 30, Consten and Grundig could not profit from
the Article 36 derogation. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605
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the existence of these rights but not their exercise."' 1
While this existence-exercise distinction provided the ECJ
with a solution for the Consten and Grundig case, many legal com-
mentators observed that the concept did not define clear bound-
aries for national intellectual property rights. 1 2 First, the Court
did not define what acts constitute "exercising" intellectual prop-
erty rights.18 3 Second, because the law tends to recognize the
existence of rights in terms of their ability to be exercised, legal
commentators questioned whether the distinction could be
drawn at all. ' 8 4
In Sirena v. Eda,185 the ECJ nevertheless continued its appli-
(providing for derogation to Articles 30 to 34 but not to other parts of Treaty). On the
other hand, Article 222 was available because it applies to the entire Treaty. Id. art. 222,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711.
181. Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 345, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 476.
182. Id. See Rothnie, supra note 163, at 159 (stating "the apparent demise of the
dichotomy between existence and exercise ... make[s] it easier for businessmen and
their advisors to determine what is, and what is not, permissible under Community
law"); A. David Demiray, Intellectual Property and the External Power of the European Commis-
sion: the New Extension, 16 MICH. J. INT. L. 187, 238 (1994) (discussing "the inherent
imprecision surrounding the existence/exercise standard"); Liam McNieve & Cyrus
Mehta, Magill and Computer Software Implications in the European Community, 4J. OF PRO-
PRIETARY RIGHTS 2 (1992) (referring to existence-exercise distinction as "sometimes
blurred").
183. See Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 345, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 476 (failing
to elaborate on what constitutes exercise of intellectual property rights and how exer-
cise of intellectual property rights are to be limited by EC Treaty); see also KORAH, supra
note 13, at 190, § 9.2 (observing that "[iun ruling that an important difference rests on
a distinction which cannot be drawn by logical analysis, the Court created a very flexible
instrument for it to develop the law").
184. See KORAH, supra note 13, at 190, § 9.2 (stating that "[i]n legal theory, it is
impossible to draw the line between existence and exercise, except at the extremes.
Analytically, the existence of a right consists of all the ways it must be exercised.");
Rothnie, supra note 163, at 28 (remarking that "dichotomy between existence and exer-
cise of intellectual property rights seems to have vanished"); Robert S. Smith, The Un-
resolved Tensions Between Trademark Protection and Free Movement of Goods in the European
Community, 3 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT. L. 89, 113 (1992) (stating, "[ult is misleading to
separate the existence of trademark rights from their exercise .... the exercise of a
property right defines its existence"); Kaoru Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Goods: A
Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REv. 433, 459 (1982) (observing that "the existence of
trademark rights without the exercise thereof has no significance"); ReneJoliet, Trade-
mark Law and the Free Movement of Goods: The Overruling of the Judgement in Hag 1, 22 INT.
Rv. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 303, 314-15 (1991). Joliet, who served as Judge at
the ECJ before his unfortunate passing in 1995, pointed out that the Hag Iljudgement
was silent on the existence-exercise dichotomy. Id. In expressing his approval of this
omission, Joliet noted that when the exercise of rights granted by national laws are
reduced, the existence of those rights are called into question. Id.
185. [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260.
1216 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1178
cation of the existence-exercise concept.186 In 1937, an Ameri-
can company, Mark Allen, assigned its "Prep" trademark for a
shaving cream to the Italian firm Sirena. 8 7 Mark Allen then li-
censed this same mark to a firm based in Germany. 188 The Ger-
man firm began to sell its product bearing the Prep mark on the
Italian market, at a price considerably lower than that of Sirena's
identically-marked good. 89 Sirena brought a trademark in-
fringement action in the Italian national courts. 190 The German
importer contended that, under the circumstances, Article 85 of
the EC Treaty prevented Sirena from exercising its Italian trade-
mark rights.' 9 '
Upon reference to the ECJ by the Italian court, pursuant to
Article 177,192 the ECJ ruled that Article 85 prevents a trademark
owner from exercising national trademark rights to restrict im-
ports bearing the same trademark, where the importer has ac-
quired use of the trademark through an agreement. 193 The ECJ
stated that Sirena's use of national trademark laws to block im-
ports, combined with other licenses and assignments made be-
186. Id.
187. Opinion of Advocate General de Lamothe, Sirena, [1971] E.C.R. at 85, [1971]
C.M.L.R. at 261.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 86, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 262.
190. Sirena, [1971] E.C.R. at 71, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 262.
191. Opinion of Advocate General de Lamothe, Sirena, [1971] E.C.R. at 86, [1971]
C.M.L.R at 262. The importer also based its defense on Article 86, which prohibits the
abuse of a dominant position by an undertaking. Id.; see EC Treaty, supra note 3, Art.
86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28. According to the Article, "[a]ny abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market•., shall be prohibited
... insofar as it may affect trade between Member States." Id.
192. See Sirena, [1971] E.C.R. at 80, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 272. The Tribunal Civile e
Penale, in Milan, brought two questions. Id. The first was whether Article 85 and 86
applied to the effects of a trademark assignment made before the EC Treaty entered
into force. Id. The ECJ answered in the affirmative. Id. at 84, [19711 C.M.L.R. at 275.
The second question was stated as follows:
Must the said Article 85 and 86 be interpreted as preventing the proprietor of
a trade-mark lawfully registered in one Member State from exercising the ab-
solute right derived from the trade-mark to prohibit third parties from import-
ing from other countries of the Community products bearing the same trade-
mark, lawfully attached to them in their place of origin?
Id. at 72, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 262. The Court responded to the Article 86 claim by.
stating that Article 86 does not apply to parties that do not have the power to impede
competition over a considerable part of the relevant market. Id. at 85, [1971] C.M.L.R.
at 275. The Court gave more attention to the Article 85 claim. Id. at 82-83, [1971]
C.M.L.R. at 273-74.
193. Id. at 84, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 275.
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tween Mark Allen and various parties in separate Member States,
could distort competition within the common market.194
The ECJ, supported by the Advocate General, further ob-
served that trademark rights merit a lesser degree of protection
than other forms of intellectual property. 195 Advocate General
Dutheillet de Lamothe's opinion explained why patents deserve
more protection than trademarks.1 96 He stated that creating a
trademark does not normally require the investment of time and
money required for the production of a patent.197 He also as-
serted that society benefits more from patents than from trade-
marks, using as an example a comparison between the Prep
trademark and penicillin. 98
b. The Specific Subject Matter Concept
Five years after the establishment of the existence-exercise
principle in Consten and Grundig, the Court presented an alterna-
tive doctrine with respect to the Free Movement of Goods princi-
ple in Deutsche Grammophon.'99 The Court held that the Article
36 derogation to Free Movement of Goods will protect only the
"specific subject matter" of an intellectual property right. '
194. Id. at 82, 10, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 274.
195. Id.; Opinion of Advocate General de Lamothe, Sirena, [1971] E.C.R. at 87-88,
[1971] C.M.L.R. at 264-66.
196. See Opinion of Advocate General de Lamothe; Sirena, [1971] E.C.R. at 87-88,
[1971] C.M.L.R. at 264-66.
197. Id. at 87, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 265.
198. Id. Mr. Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe also opined that, while
trademarks once provided consumers with a guarantee of quality, they more recently
have become merely an aid to advertising. Id.
199. [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631.
200. Id. at 500, 11, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 657. The Court reiterated the distinction
between existence and exercise introduced in Consten and Grundig, but it immediately
modified the distinction in the next sentence with its specific object principle. Id. at
499-500, 11, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 657. The Court did not, however, explain what it
meant with the term "specific subject matter." Id.
The phrases "specific subject matter" and "specific object" are the European Court
Reports' and the Common Market Law Reports' two different translations of the same
term used in the ECJ's original decisions written in French. Compare Deutsche Gram.-
mophon, [1971] II E.C.R. at 500, 11 (using term "specific subject matter") and Cen-
trafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1194, 7 (employing "specific subject matter" us-
age) with Deutsche Grammophone, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 657, 11 (referring to "specific
object") and Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508, 7 (opting for "specific
object" usage). The original French term is "l'objet sp6cifique." See Deutsche Gram-
mophone, [1971] Recueil de la jurisprudence de la Cour 487, 500, 11. The original
French decision reads, "l'article 36 n'admet de ddrogations A cette libert6 que dans la
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Although Deutsche Grammophone involved copyrights, its specific
subject matter concept applies to intellectual property in gen-
eral.20 1 The doctrine decrees that use of a trademark right fall-
ing under Article 30 is permissible under Article 36 only if the
specific subject matter of the trademark right is at stake. 212 If
the specific subject matter of the right is not at stake, the ECJ
considers the trademark right to be a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States pursuant to the Article 36 pro-
viso.
203
Although the Court did not explicitly define the specific
subject matter of intellectual property rights, 20 4 it did state that
once a copyright owner has marketed or consented to the mar-
keting of its product in another Member State, it may not block
imports of that product through the use of national intellectual
property rights. 20 5 Thus, the specific subject matter of copy-
rights entitles the copyright owner to benefit fully from intellec-
tual property laws in one Member State, but restricts such a
holder from using copyrights in several Member States to im-
pede free trade.20 6 The Court did not address whether this in-
terpretation of the specific subject matter doctrine applied to
other forms of intellectual property.20 7
For trademarks, the case Centrafarm v. Winthrop" 8 provided
the answer to how the specific subject matter concept applied
outside of copyright protection.20 9 In Winthrop, the Court clari-
mesure ou elles sont justifi6es par la sauveguard de droits qui constituent l'objet
spicifique de cette proprift&" Id. (emphasis added).
201. See Deutsche Grammophone, [19711 II E.C.R. at 500, 11, [1971] C.M.L.R. at
657 (stating that Article 36 admits for derogations from Free Movement of Goods prin-
ciple only to safeguard specific subject matter of "industrial and commercial property").
See, e.g., Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (applying
specific subject matter concept to trademark division): Centrafarm v. Sterling, [1974]
E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (applying specific subject matter principle to divi-
sion of patent rights).
202. Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480.
203. Id.; Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. at 500, 11, [1971] C.M.L.R. at
657.
204. See Deutsche Grammophone, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (neglect-
ing to state what consists of specific subject matter with regard to intellectual property
rights).
205. Id. at 500, 12, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 657.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631.
208. [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480.
209. Id.
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fled the specific subject matter concept introduced in Deutsche
Grammophon. ° Winthrop, a parallel importation case, involved a
company that had registered its trademark for medical drugs,
through its subsidiaries, in both the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.2 11  The product sold at a considerable price differ-
ence in the two countries. 2  As a result, the drug manufacturer,
Winthrop, enlisted Dutch trademark law to prevent Centrafarm,
a parallel importer, from taking advantage of the price discrep-
ancy. 2 13
To determine the extent of Winthrop's trademark rights
under Article 36, the Court recited the existence-exercise dis-
tinction, 4 then stated that Article 36 could safeguard only the
specific subject matter of trademarks.2 15  The Court defined a
trademark's specific subject matter as allowing a trademark
owner to put products into circulation for the first time, thereby
preventing competitors' unauthorized use of the trademark and
the reputation it carries.21 Once an owner has consented to
putting a trademarked product into circulation for the first time,
210. Id. at 1194, 8, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508.
211. Id. at 1185, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 484.
212. Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1185, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 484.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1194, 6, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
215. Id. at 1194, 7, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
216. Id. at 1194, 8, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508. The Court defined the specific
subject matter of trademarks as follows:
[T]he guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right to
use that trade mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by the
trade mark into circulation for the first time, [thereby] protect[ing] him
against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of
the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.
Id. at 1194, 9, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508.
In the case Centrafarm v. Sterling, the Court defined the specific object of patents: to
reward the inventor's creative effort by granting it the exclusive right to manufacture
products and put them into circulation for the first time. Centrafarm v. Sterling, [1974]
E.C.R. at 1162, 9, [1974] C.M.L.R. at 503. Sterling owned patents for pharmaceuticals
in the Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom, where Crown subsidies reduced the
price to about half that in the Netherlands. Id. at 1149, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 484; see
KoRAn, supra note 13, § 9.4.1, at 192 (explaining that English Government paid for
most medical drugs used in United Kingdom). When Centrafarm attempted to take
advantage of this price differential through parallel importation, Sterling contended
that its Dutch patent rights could block the imports under the Article 36 derogation.
Centrafarm v. Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. at 1149, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 484. The Court, how-
ever, in view of the specific subject matter of patents, would not permit Sterling to use
patent rights to protect its investment in Holland, because it had already profited from
its returns in the United Kingdom. Id. at 1163, 15, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 504. Ster-
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the right is exhausted. 7 Because an owner can exhaust his in-
tellectual property rights, this has been termed the exhaustion
doctrine. 18 Consequently, Winthrop, having reaped benefits
from putting its product into circulation in the United Kingdom
under British trademark protection, could not thereafter use
Dutch trademark laws to divide up the European market.
219
c. The Essential Function of Trademarks
While the Court has applied the concept of specific subject
matter to all types of intellectual property cases,2 2 0 two ECJ deci-
sions rendered in 1978 revealed that trademarks required fur-
ther analysis.221 In both Hoffman LaRoche v. Centrafarm222 and
Centrafarm v. AHP,22 1 the Court, after reciting the specific subject
matter of a trademark, stated that the scope of the owner's trade-
mark right must be further defined by its essential function. 2 4
In Hoffman LaRoche, the Court upheld Hoffman LaRoche's
ling's actions thus constituted a disguised restriction on trade between Member States
under the second sentence of Article 36. Id. at 1162, 17, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
217. Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1194, 19, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508-
09.
218. See EC Trademark Directive, supra note 52, art. 7, O.J. L 40/1, at 5 (1988).
The EC Trademark Directive has codified the doctrine of exhaustion as follows:
Exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade mark
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in
relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community
under that trade mark by the proprietor with his consent.
Id.
219. Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1194, 9, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508-
09.
220. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammphon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631
(holding that Article 36 safeguards only specific subject matter of national copyrights);
Centrafarm v. Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (applying specific sub-
ject matter principle to limit national patent rights); Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974]
E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (stating that national trademark rights are pro-
tected only so far as their specific subject matter is concerned); see supra notes 136-54
and accompanying text (reviewing jurisprudence regarding specific subject matter doc-
trine).
221. See Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (explaining
that evaluating trademark rights of proprietor necessitates analysis beyond mere consid-
eration of specific subject matter of trademarks); Centrafarrm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R.
1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 (stating that assessing trademark owner's rights requires
further consideration).
222. [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217.
223. [1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326.
224. Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R at 1164, 7, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 241; Cen-
trafarm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1840, 1 12, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 342-43.
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right under Article 36 to exert German trademark law where
Centrafarm had purchased Hoffman LaRoche's valium pills in
England and repackaged them with both the Hoffman and Cen-
trafarm marks for sale in Germany. 25 Centrafarm, which prac-
ticed parallel trade' in pharmaceutical products, imported Hoff-
man LaRoche's products into Germany with the Hoffman La-
Roche trademark and the words "Marketed by Centrafarm
GmbH" on the outside of the package. 22 16 Hoffman LaRoche,
which was marketing its product in Germany as well as England,
obtained an injunction from the local German court to block
Centrafarm's imports.227
Upon appeal by Centrafarm and reference to the ECJ,2 2 8
the Court considered whether Hoffman LaRoche's use of Ger-
man trademark law to block Centrafarm's imports was within the
specific subject matter of its trademark rights. 229 The Court
ruled that, given a trademark's essential function, Hoffmann La-
Roche was entitled to block Centrafarm's repackaged imports.3 °
The Court stated that a trademark's essential function was to
guarantee the origin of the trademarked product to the con-
sumer by enabling him to distinguish that product from prod-
ucts of another origin. 31
The ECJ also analyzed the essential function of trademarks
in Centrafarm v. AHP.23 2 The issue was Whether AHP's use of
slightly different trademarks, along with slightly different flavors,
for its pharmaceutical products in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands constituted a disguised restriction on trade in viola-
tion of Articles 30 through 36.33 Centrafarm had bought AHP's
225. Hoffmann LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217.
226. Id. at 1142, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 220.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1142, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 220-21.
229. Id. at 1163, 1 6, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 241.
230. Id. at 1164, 7, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 241.
231. Id. The Court declared that the essential function was "to guarantee the iden-
tity of the origin of the trade marked product to the consumer or ultimate user by
enabling him without any possibility of confusion to distinguish that product from
products which have another origin." Id.
232. [1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326.
233. Centrafarm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1840, 1 12, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 342-43.
Unlike in Hoffman LaRoche, the Court stated that once the specific subject matter of the
trademark was taken into account, the essential function would be considered in excep-
tional circumstances. Id. (emphasis supplied). See Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. at
1164, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 241 (neglecting to limit application of essential function
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products, labeled "Serinid D," on the British market, and repack-
aged them with the "Seresta" mark.234 Centrafarm then sold the
repackaged products in the Netherlands, where AHP was already
circulating its product under the "Seresta" label. 3 5 Centrafarm,
as plaintiff, claimed that AHP could not benefit from Dutch
trademark law because its use of different marks and different
flavors for its products violated Articles 30 through 36.236
The Court, however, held that a manufacturer may use dif-
ferent marks for the same product in different Member States,
provided that the manufacturer is not engaging in a disguised
restriction on parallel trade between Member States. 237 In com-
ing to its conclusion, the Court stated that the essential function
of a trademark, to guarantee to consumers the origin of the
marked product, allows a trademark proprietor to use national
trademark laws to prevent a third party from deceiving consum-
concept to "exceptional circumstances"). Although the Court did not further elabo-
rate, this phrase suggests that the Court did not want to advocate always considering
essential function when addressing the specific object of trademarks. Centrafarm v.
AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1840, 1 12, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 342-43. The Court perhaps
thought that the essential function of a trademark was worthy of consideration only in
cases difficult to decide. Id.
In Danske Supermarked v. Imerco, for example, the Court denied a company recourse
to national trademark rights despite consumer confusion. Danske Supermarked A/S v.
Imerco A/S, Case 58/80, [1981] E.C.R. 181, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 590. The facts were that
the Danish company Imerco ordered chinaware with the words "Imerco Fiftieth Anni-
versary" and had to reject a number of the items due to substandard quality. Id. at 190-
91, 2, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 599-600. Imerco permitted these inferior products to be
sold, as long as they were not resold in Denmark. Id. at 191, 2, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at
600. When an importer repackaged the items for sale into Denmark, Imerco looked to
Danish trademark and copyright law to prevent the resale. Id. at 191, 1 4, (1981] 3
C.M.L.R. at 600.
The ECJ held that since Imerco had consented to circulating its products within
another Member State, it had exhausted its trademark and copyright. Id. at 196-97,
[1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 603-04. The Advocate General in Danske Supermarked felt that the
proprietor's consent outweighed the consumer confusion that would result from prod-
ucts of varying quality being marketed with the Imerco name. Opinion of Advocate
General Capotorti, Danske Supermarked A/S v. Imerco A/S, Case 58/80, [1981] E.C.R..
at 201, 3, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 597.
234. Centrafarm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1825, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1825, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328-29.
237. Id, at 1843, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 344. To decide the question of when the use
of different marks in fact constitutes a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States, the Court writes, "[I] t is for the national court to decide in each particular case
whether the proprietor has followed the practice of using different marks for the same
product for the purpose of partitioning the markets." Id. at 1-1842, 23, [1979] 1
C.M.L.R. at 343.
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ers by changing the proprietor's mark.23 8 Both Hoffman LaRoche
and Centrafarm v. AHP, therefore, interpreted trademarks in
terms not only associated with the owner's intellectual property
rights but also with respect to the consumer's interest.23 9
2. Involuntary Division
Along with the developments regarding the voluntary divi-
sion of trademarks,24 ° a set of cases arose involving the involun-
tary splitting of trademarks. 24 1 The ECJ applied a separate set of
doctrines to resolve these issues:242 the common origin princi-
238. Centrafarm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1840, 15, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 343.
239. Id.; Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. at 1164, 7, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 241.
Two years earlier, in Terrapin v. Terranova, the ECJ had noted that the basic function of
a trademark was to guarantee to consumers that a product has a certain origin. Case
119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, 1061, 6, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482, 505-06. The concept of
essential function, therefore, was not completely new in the ECJ's decisions of Hoff-
mann-LaRoche and Centrafarm v. AHP. Id. Both Hoffmann-LaRoche and Centrafarm v.
AHP did represent, however, the first time that the ECJ expressly stated that the scope
of a trademark owner's rights must be further defined by the trademark's essential
function. See Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R at 1164, 7, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 241
(explaining that, in addition to specific subject matter of trademark right, essential
function must be considered); Centrafarm v. AHP, [1978] E.C.R. at 1840, 12, [1979] 1
C.M.L.R. at 342-43 (stating that trademark proprietor's rights must consider essential
function of trademark).
240. See, e.g., Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (estab-
lishing distinction between existence and exercise); Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974]
E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (defining specific object); Hoffmann-LaRoche,
[1978] E.C.R 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (introducing essential function).
241. See Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (addressing involuntary
splitting of mark); Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (analyzing invol-
untary trademark division).
242. See Hag , [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (establishing common
origin doctrine in case of involuntary trademark division); Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (applying doctrine of consent to involuntary splitting of trade-
mark).
The ECJ developed separate doctrines for voluntary division because in these cases,
determining the rights of trademark proprietors depends in part on the fact that these
proprietors have taken an action which resulted in the splitting of the trademark. See,
e.g., Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] II E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (holding that once
copyright owner has marketed or consented to marketing of product in another Mem-
ber State, it may not use national intellectual property rights to block resulting im-
ports); Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. at 1194, 1 9, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 508-09
(stating that once owner consents to putting trademarked product into circulation for
first time, right is exhausted).
In cases of involuntary division, the ECJ must base its analysis on factors other than
the trademark owner's consent to the division of its mark, because the owner did not
provide such consent. See HagI, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (stating that
national trademark rights not enforceable because trademarks derived from common
origin). Indeed, far from having to consider the proprietor's consent, the Court has
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pie 45 and its successor, the consent doctrine. 4 4 The consent
doctrine provides that an involuntary trademark division does
not exhaust a trademark proprietor's national trademark rights
because the proprietor has not consented to the division of its
trademark.245
a. The Common Origin Doctrine
In Hag J,246 the ECJ considered whether Articles 30 through
36 prohibited the Luxembourg-based firm Van Zuylen Fr~res
from exerting its local Benelux trademark rights247 against the
German company Hag AG.248 Van Zuylen Frres sought to pre-
vent Hag AG from selling its competing product with the same
"Hag" mark in Luxembourg.2 49 The two companies traced their
origin to the Belgian subsidiary of the German firm Hag AG.25 °
Shortly after World War II, this Belgian subsidiary was seized by
based its reasoning on the very fact that no such consent existed. See Hag II, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (reversing HagI in holding that, because trade-
mark owner did not consent to trademark split, it has not exhausted its national intel-
lectual property rights).
243. See Hag , [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127. The common origin
principle established that, where trademarks appearing in different Member States de-
rive from a common origin, a trademark owner may not use national trademark rights
to prevent the importation of identically-marked goods coming from another Member
State. Id.
244. See HagII, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711. [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571. The consent doctrine
states that a trademark proprietor may enforce its national trademark rights as long as it
has not consented to the splitting of its trademark. Id.
245. Id.
246. [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127.
247. See Benelux Convention on Trade Marks of March 19, 1962, March 19, 1962,
704 U.N.T.S. 301. In 1962, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands agreed to im-
plement uniform national trademark laws. Id. art. 1, at 302-04. The Treaty begins as
follows:
His Majesty the King of Belgium,
Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchesse of Luxembourg,
Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands,
The Above Contracting Parties shall implement in their national laws,
either in one of the original texts or in both texts, the uniform Benelux law on
trademarks, annexed to the present Convention, and shall establish a com-
mon bureau under the name "Benelux Trademark Bureau."
Id. (Author's translation from French text). See generally W. MAR & H. MOLIJN, INTRO-
DUCTION TO TRADE MARK LAw IN THE BENELUX (1982) (surveying broadly trademark
protection in Benelux countries).
248. Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 732-33, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 129-30.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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the Belgian Government, as enemy reparations from Germany,
and was eventually sold to Van Zuylen Fr~res in Luxembourg.251
The parent firm, meanwhile, remained a German company.252
The Hag trademark thus became separately owned in Germany
and Luxembourg. 253
Van Zuylen Fr~res argued that its attempt to block Hag AG's
identically-marked imports fell within the specific subject matter
of its trademark rights.2 54 The Court, however, responded that
trademark owners may not rely upon territorial limitations of na-
tional trademark rights to block imports. 55 It held that, despite
the involuntary nature of the trademark division, Van Zuylen
Frres could not use its national trademark rights to block the
importation of the identical Hag mark because the two marks
came from the same origin.256 This established the doctrine of
common origin.257
b. The Doctrine of Consent
More recently, in Hag I1,258 the Court expressly rejected the
common origin doctrine and adopted the consent doctrine.259
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 737, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 129. Recall that a few years before the HagI
judgement, Deutsche Grammophon had established that Article 36 protected the specific
subject matter of national intellectual property rights. Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] I]
E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631.
255. Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 744, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 143. The Advocate General
in Hag I supported this view and stated that, while the specific subject matter of trade-
marks was to indicate origin, it does not include the right to enjoy territorial protection
deriving from national trademark legislation. Opinion of Advocate General Mayras,
Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 754, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 141.
256. Hag I, [1974] E.C.R. at 744, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 143.
257. See, e.g., Rothnie, supra note 163, at 25 (stating that, with Hag I ruling, "the
doctrine of common origin was born"). The case Terrapin v. Terranova confirmed the
Hag Ijudgement. [1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R 482. In Terrapin, the Court
held that an owner's intellectual property right is exhausted when its product is mar-
keted in another member state, even when a trademark has been subdivided by public
mandate. Id. at 1061, 6, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 505-06.
258. Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571.
259. Id. See Joliet, supra note 184, at 319. Judge Joliet agreed with the Court's
decision in Hag II to ignore the precedent of Hag I:
The Hag /judgement shows that the value of precedent is not absolute for
the Court. Admittedly, a doctrine of binding precedent enhances legal cer-
tainty, but wherever it can be shown that an existing decision is clearly wrong,
as was the case with the judgement in Hag I, the Court can be expected to
review its position. That is a conclusion over which we should all rejoice.
1226 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1178
In the late 1970's, Van Zuylen Fr~res had new ownership, which
attempted to sell its product with the Hag mark in Germany. 60
Hag AG then utilized its trademark rights to block the imports,
as Van Zuylen Fr~res had attempted in Hag 1.261 When the case
came to the ECJ, the Court focused not on the common origin
of the trademarks, but on Hag AG's lack of consent to the split-
ting of the original trademark. 62
Because Hag AG never consented to Van Zuylen Fr~res'
marketing of the Hag trademark in Germany, the Court held
that Hag AG did not exhaust its trademark rights. 263 With this
declaration, the Court formally adopted the doctrine of consent,
stating that exhaustion of intellectual property rights occurs only
with the owner's consent to putting its product into circula-
* 21tion. 64 If a trademark owner's mark divides involuntarily, there-
fore, the Court would not consider that proprietor to have ex-
hausted the specific subject matter of its national trademark
right.265 If Van Zuylen Fr~res had been a subsidiary of Hag AG,
this would have amounted to consent on the part of Hag AG.2 6 6
But, because Van Zuylen Fr~res existed as a legally and economi-
cally independent entity, neither consent nor exhaustion took
place. 267
Id.
260. Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3712-13, [1990] C.M.L.R. at 572-73. The facts in
Hag II were the converse of those in Hag L Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1-3758-59, 15, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 608.
263. Id. at 1-3759-60, 20, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 609.
264. Id.; see Tritton, supra note 19, at 424 (discussing establishment of consent
doctrine in Hag II).
265. See, e.g., Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480
(establishing that specific subject matter of intellectual property right is consent to put-
ting product into circulation for first time). The Hag II holding thus places emphasis
on the term "consent" when applying the specific subject matter of national trademark
rights. Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3759-60, 20, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 609-10.
266. See Hag II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3758-59, 15, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 608. The
ECJ stated that the determinative factor is the absence of consent on the part of the
trademark proprietor to putting products into circulation, in another Member State,
which are then marketed by an undertaking economically and legally independent of
that proprietor. Id. The Court specified that, while the trademark initially belonged to
a subsidiary of Hag AG, the expropriation of that subsidiary resulted in the trademark
being acquired by a third party, Van Zuylen Frres. Id. at 1-3757, 1 9, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R.
at 607.
267. Id. at 1-3759, 19, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 609. The Court also emphasized the
essential function of a trademark, recalling that it was to guarantee the origin of a
marked product by "enabling [the consumer] without any possibility of confusion to
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The Court's requirement of voluntary consent in Hag II had
precedence in prior non-trademark cases. 268  In Keurkoop v.
Nancy Kean Gifts,2 69 for instance, the Court ruled that because
Nancy Kean had not consented to the selling of her handbags in
Germany, she could invoke her Benelux design rights to keep
German imports of her products out of the Netherlands.27 ° In
Pharmon v. Hoechst,271 the Court found that where a Dutch pat-
ent holder's compulsory licensee2 72 in the United Kingdom ex-
ported its products into the Netherlands, the patent holder
could block the importation because it had not consented to the
licensing.273
C. The Ideal Standard Decision
In light of the consent doctrine established in Hag 11,274 the
ECJ determined in Ideal Standard whether a proprietor's assign-
ment of its trademark rights constituted consent. 275 On the one
distinguish that product." Id. at 1-3758, 14, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 608. In order to
preserve the 'Hag' mark's essential function, the Court stated, Hag AG would need to
block Van Zuylen Frres' products from entering the German market so that consum-
ers could identify the source of the product. Id. at 1-3759, 16, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at
608. If Van Zuylen Fr~res' products entered Germany, consumers would be confronted
with two 'Hag' brands of possibly varying quality. Id. In analyzing a trademark's essen-
tial function, the Court not only rejected the common origin doctrine favored in HagI,
but it endorsed a policy on trademark rights which focused on the consumer. Id.
268. See Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, Case 144/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2853,
[1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47 (focusing on significance of design right owner's consent);
Pharmon v. Hoechst, [1985] E.C.R. 2281, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (requiring voluntary
consent by patent proprietor).
269. [1982] E.C.R. 2853, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47
270. Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts, [1982] E.C.R. at 2881, 29, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. at
84.
271. [1985] E.C.R. 2281, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775.
272. Pharmon v. Hoechst, [1985] E.C.R. at 2298, 25, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 791.
273. Id.
274. See HagII, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (introducing principle
of consent).
275. See Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2847, 48, 49, 34, 37, 40, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. 907, 908, 909. In reviewing the established doctrines, the Court states:
The exhaustion of rights applies where the owner of the trademark in the
importing State and the owner of the trade mark in the exporting State are
the same or where, even if they are separate persons, they are economically
linked. A number of situations are covered ..... In [these situations] the
function of the trademark is in no way called into question by freedom to
import .... The problem posed by the [lower court's] question is whether
the same principles apply where the trademark has been assigned.
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hand, this assignment represented a voluntary act because the
proprietor executed an assignment by choice.276 On the other
hand, the act was involuntary because the assignee, not the pro-
prietor, placed the trademarked product into circulation. 277
The Court resolved this difficulty 78 by narrowing its concept of
consent to exclude assignments.279
1. Background to Ideal Standard
American Standard, a manufacturer of heating equipment
and sanitary ware,280 was a U.S.-based company with interna-
tional subsidiaries situated in various nations, including France
and Germany.28' The German subsidiary, Ideal Standard GmbH
("IS GmbH"), owned the trademark "Ideal Standard" in Ger-
many.28 2 Since 1976, IS GmbH dealt in sanitary ware only, due
to American Standard's decision to end its operations in heating
equipment.2
83
American Standard's French subsidiary, Ideal Standard SA
("ISSA"), first registered the Ideal Standard trademark in 1949,
for both sanitary ware and heating installations in France.284 As
its parent began to close down its heating equipment operations
in 1975, ISSA turned over its manufacturing and marketing activ-
ities in heating equipment to SGF, a French company with which
276. See id. at 1-2850, 42, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909 (referring to Commission's
contention that by assigning its mark trademark owner gave implied consent to marked
products being put into circulation).
277. See id. at 1-2849-50, 41, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909 (stating that assignments
result in products being marketed by assignee); id. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at
909 (stating that with assignments, determination of which products will be affixed to
mark, and control over quality of products, is lost).
278. See id. at 1-2849-50, 1 41-43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909 (failing to reconcile
previously established concept of consent with assignment).
279. See id. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909 (holding that "consent im-
plicit in any assignment is not the consent required for the application of the doctrine
of exhaustion of rights").
280. See XIV OxFoRD, supra note 4, 463. Sanitary ware is defined as "the distinctive
epithet of appliances specially contrived with a view to sanitary requirements; e.g. of
certain makes of wallpaper, of glazed tiles for flooring and walls,,of non-absorbent pipes
for drainage; and the like." Id.
281. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 2839, 3, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 902.
282. Id.
283. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2794, 2, 3, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 861-62. These and other facts were detailed by the
Advocate General but did not appear in the Court's Judgment. Id.
284. Id. at 1-2793, 4, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 862.
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it had no economic links.285 In 1984, as a result of SGF's desire
to market its heating installation products under the Ideal Stan-
dard name, ISSA assigned its trademark for heating equipment
to SGF.286 Subsequently, SGF, a part of the French holding com-
pany Nord Est, assigned the trademark to Compagnie Internati-
onale de Chauffage ("CICh"), another entity within the Nord Est
group.287 Meanwhile, IS SA retained the mark for sanitary
ware.
288
CICh began producing heating installations in France
under the Ideal Standard trademark.289 Although CICh never
sold this equipment in France, beginning in 1988 it sold the
equipment in Germany through its German subsidiary, IHT In-
ternationale Heiztechnik GmbH ("IHT") .290 As a result, two
Ideal Standard marks were being used in Germany. 29' First,
American Standard's German subsidiary, IS GmbH, sold sanitary
ware under the 'Ideal Standard' name.292 Second, IHT sold
heating installations under the same label.293
IS GmbH brought an action for trademark infringement
against IHT before Germany's local court.294  The plaintiff
sought an injunction against IHT, prohibitting IHT from mar-
keting heating equipment bearing the Ideal Standard mark in
Germany.295 IS GmbH contended that IHT's Ideal Standard
heating equipment would create a risk of confusion 296 with the
identically labelled sanitary ware sold by IS GmbH.2 97 The Ger-
man court held that IHT had infringed IS GmbH's trademark
285. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2839, 5, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 902.
286. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2793, 4, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 862.
287. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2839, 5, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 902.
288. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2794, 4, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 862.
289. Id. at 1-2794, 5, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 862.
290. Id.
291. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2839, 6, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 902.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1-2839, 2840, 6, 8, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 902, 903. The German court
was the Landgericht Dusseldorf. Id.
295. Id. at 1-2840, 7, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 903.
296. Id. at 1-2840, 9, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 903. German trademark law prohibits
the use of a trademark so similar in name to another mark as to create a risk of confu-
sion for the public. Id.
297. Id.
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rights. 98 IHT appealed to a higher German court, 9 which re-
ferred the question to the ECJ.30 0
2. Advocate General Gulmann's Opinion
Pursuant to ECJ procedure,3 0 ' Advocate General Gulmann
analyzed the arguments of the parties and made his recommen-
dation to the Court Justices. °2 In addition to IS GmbH and
IHT, the EC Commission, the German Government, and the
United Kingdom submitted written arguments.303  In order to
clarify the maze of transactions that led to IS GmbH's action for
infringement, both the Advocate General and the Court made
several factual conclusions. 0 4 After narrowing down the rele-
vant facts, the Advocate General stated that an analysis based on
exhaustion of national trademark rights could not decide the
Ideal Standard case. 0 5 Instead, the Advocate General applied his
own balancing method, weighing both consumer and proprietor
298. Id. at 1-2840, 1 8, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 903.
299. Id. at 1-2840, 9, 11, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 903. The appellate court was the
Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf. Id.
300. Id. at 1-2841, 12, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 903. The question was posed to the
ECJ as follows:
Does it constitute an unlawful restriction of intra-Community trade, within the
meaning of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty, for an undertaking carrying on
business in Member State A which is a subsidiary of a manufacturer of heating
equipment based in Member State B to be prohibited from using as a trade-
mark the name 'Ideal Standard' on the grounds of risk of confusion with a
mark having the same origin, where the name 'Ideal Standard' is lawfully used
by the manufacturer in its home country by virtue of a trademark registered
there which it has acquired by private contract and which was originally the
property of a company affiliated to the undertaking which is opposing, in
Member State A, the importation of goods marked 'Ideal Standard'?
Id.
301. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685. Article 166 of
the EC Treaty provides that for every case an Advocate General must make an impartial
written analysis of the case in order to assist the Court in coming to its decision. Id.; see
supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing Advocate General's role in ECJ pro-
ceedings).
302. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, 1-2793-835, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. at 861-901.
303. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2837, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 903. The Com-
mission, Germany and the United Kingdom, while having no legal rights at stake in the
case, submitted arguments as interested parties. Id.
304. Id. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857.
305. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2807, 1 51, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 875.
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interests.3 0 6
a. Narrowing Down the Relevant Facts
First, Advocate General Gulmann stated that IS GmbH,
although it did not assign the Ideal Standard trademark to SGF,
should be held responsible for ISSA's assignment to SGF.3 7 Be-
cause IS GmbH and the assignor ISSA both were part of the
same American Standard group, Gulmann observed that the two
could coordinate their actions.30" The ECJ did not dispute this
assumption in its judgment.3 0 9
In addition, both the Advocate General and the Court con-
cluded that the products were put into circulation for the first
time in France.3 10 The opinions focus on the issue of whether IS
306. Id. at 1-2797, 15, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 865.
307. Id. at 1-2811, 68, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 879. The Advocate General stated
that:
In my view it is correct, as contended by IHT and the Commission, that the
group connection between Ideal-Standard GmbH and its French affiliate
means that the companies are assimilated into one another, so that the assign-
ment is to be ascribed to Ideal-Standard GmbH as if it had been effected by
that company itself. Contrary to the claim of Ideal-Standard Gmbh, it must
suffice that undertakings within the same group have the opportunity to coor-
dinate their marketing policy in the common interest of the group. It cannot
be a determinant factor whether that opportunity in practice is taken up.
Id.
308. See id. at 1-2810-11, 1 67, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 878. Gulmann states:
This situation is based on the idea that the situation in which the Court is
called upon to give its ruling is actually a situation in which the assignor of the
trade mark is seeking to prevent direct sale by the assignee on the territory for
which the assignor has retained his trade mark. However, as may be seen from
... the question referred to the Court, the characteristic situation here is that
in France the trade mark was assigned not by Ideal-Standard GmbH, which is
seeking to oppose importation into Germany, but by the latter's French affili-
ate.
Id.
309. See Ideal Standard, [1994) E.C.R. at 1-2489, 1 40, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 907.
The Court, attributing the assignment to IS GmbH, states:
[T]he trademark has been assigned, for one or several Member States only, to
an undertaking which has no economic link with the assignor and the assignor
opposes the marketing, in the State in which he has retained the trade mark,
of products to which the trade mark has been affixed by the assignee.
Id.
310. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2812, 72, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 880 (stating that Ideal Standard case concerns assign-
ment, whereby "the proprietor consents to others applying the mark to their product
and marketing them both in the country concerned and in the rest of the Commu-
nity"); see also Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 2851, 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10.
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GmbH gave consent to putting the products into circulation.
31
'
Neither opinion considers that, far from the possibility of IS
Gmbh having consented to circulation of goods in France, the
products never entered circulation in France. 1 In other words,
IS GmbH was opposing direct imports, not parallel importa-
tion.313 Because IS GmbH's marked products were put into cir-
culation for the first time in Germany, IS GmbH could have ar-
gued that by blocking IHT's direct imports it was still safeguard-
ing the specific subject matter of its trademark right.314 IS
GmbH could exert German trademark law, therefore, regardless
of whether its assignment of the trademark constituted con-
sent.313 Neither IS GmbH, the Advocate General, nor the Court,
however, discuss this point.3 1 6
Both Gulmann and the Court agreed that, of the two trade-
mark assignments described in the factual circumstances, ISSA's
assignment to SGF was the only relevant assignment because it
first transferred the mark to an entity independent of ISSA. 17
The Court, analogizing the facts of Hag II to the Ideal Standard situation, stated "the
determinant factor was absence of consent of the proprietor of the trade mark in the
importing State to the putting into circulation in the exporting State of products mar-
keted by the proprietor of the right in the latter State." Id.
311. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2820, 102, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 887-88 (stating that "[a] trademark proprietor who
concludes a separate assignment for certain Member States has voluntarily relinquished
the right to be the only one to market on Community territory products bearing the
mark in question"); see also Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. at 909 (holding that "[t]he consent implicit in any assignment is not the con-
sent required for the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of rights").
312. See Tritton, supra note 19, at 424 (observing that "in Ideal Standard the prod-
ucts in casu were directly imported from the manufacturer and thus it could be said that
they had not been put into circulation in France").
313. See id. (remarking that Ideal Standard is actually not parallel importation
case).
314. See id. (observing that IS GmbH could have submitted that products were first
placed into circulation in Germany, not France).
315. See id. at 424-25 (stating that IS GmbH could have been justified in exerting
German trademark rights because it sought to protect specific subject matter of trade-
mark in circulating its marked products for first time in Germany).
316. See Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (neglecting to
raise issue of whether IS GmbH was within its specific subject matter right regardless of
consent).
317. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2974, 4, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 862; Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 2839, 4, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. at 902. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (referring throughout to IS GmbH's decision to
assign mark to SGF but not to subsequent assignment of mark by SGF to CICh).
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Regardless of SGF's subsequent decision to assign the mark to
CICh, which then attempted to export the marked products into
IS GmbH's territory via IHT, IS GmbH could have expected that
products with the Ideal Standard label would eventually end up
in Germany due to ISSA's assignment to SGF. 318 The Court and
the Advocate General, therefore, treated the case as if IS GmbH
had assigned its mark directly to IHT. t °
Finally, Advocate General Gulmann and the Court both
stated that the extent to which sanitary ware and heating installa-
tions are similar products remained a matter for national law.32 °
Because the risk of confusion between these products was to be
determined by German trademark law, the ECJ treated the case
as if IS GmbH's sanitary ware and IHT's heating equipment were
the same type of product.3 2  Gulmann and the Court con-
318. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-
2820, 1 102, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 887-88. Advocate General Gulmann stated that "[a]
trade mark proprietor who concludes a separate assignment for certain Member States
has voluntarily relinquished the right to be the only one to market on Community
territory products bearing the mark in question." Id. See also Ideal Standard, [1994]
E.C.R. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909 (stating that "power [of controlling
quality] is lost if, by assignment, control over the trademark is surrendered to a third
party having no economic link with the assignor").
319. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2827, 136, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 894 (hypothesizing situation whereby Court would
permit IS GmbH to oppose importation of marked product by "assignee of the mark");
Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 41, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909. The ECJ noted,
in reference to the facts of the case, that "a contract of assignment.., does not give the
assignor any means of controlling the quality of products which are marketed by the
assignee." Id. (emphasis added).
320. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2834, 154, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 900; Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2843, 1 20,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 905.
321. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2834, 156, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 901. The Advocate General explained that, with
regard to sanitary ware and heating equipment, it did not appear that the German
government had intentionally broadened the risk of confusion concept so as to protect
the German trademark owner IS GmbH. Id. Gulmann noted that this would have con-
stituted a violation by the German government of the second sentence of Article 36. Id.
He cites the case Deutsche Renault, which states:
There is nothing to suggest that German courts make a broad interpretation
of the concept of confusion where the protection of the trade mark of a Ger-
man producer is at issue, but make a strict interpretation of the same concept
where the protection of the trade mark of a producer established in another
Member State is concerned.
Id. (citing Deutsche Renault AG v. Audi AG, Case 317/91, [1993] E.C.R. at 6230, 1 13,
[1993] 1 C.M.L.R. at 891). The Advocate General would therefore assume that the two
products could have confusingly similar marks under German law. Id.; see also Ideal
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cluded, in sum, that IS GmbH had licensed its Ideal Standard
trademark to IHT, which had then circulated its own similar
products bearing the mark in France and wished to do so in IS
322GmbH's territory, Germany.
b. Did the Assignor Exhaust Its Trademark Rights?
IS GmbH and the German and UK Governments argued
that IS GmbH's consent to assignment of its trademark did not
amount to the consent required by the exhaustion doctrine.2 3
Both IHT and the Commission, on the other hand, maintained
that consent to an assignment satisfies exhaustion.324 Gulmann
concluded that exhaustion was inapplicable under the circum-
stances of the case, because exhaustion applies only where the
parallel rightholders in separate Member States are economi-
cally linked, such as through a parent-subsidiary relationship.3 25
i. Arguments of the Parties
IS Gmbh, Germany, and the United Kingdom stated that
the consent required by the exhaustion principle allows the
trademark owner to control the quality of the marked product
when it is put into circulation.32 6 This ensures that the mark's
reputation will not be tarnished by substandard products carry-
ing the mark. 27 Consenting to a mere assignment, they argued,
does not afford the assignor this control.3 28
Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 2843, 1 20, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 905 (stating that "the Court
must also proceed on the assumption that there is a risk of confusion . .. as if the
products for which the trade mark was assigned and those covered by the registration
relied on in Germany were identical").
322. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2810-11, 67, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 878.
323. Id. at 1-2806, 1 49, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 874. Germany and the United King-
dom, in their capacity as national governments which enforced their own intellectual
property laws, supported IS GmbH's contention that national trademark rights should
prevail over EC law in this case. Id.
324. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 42, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909. The
Commission, whose task is to ensure that Member States conform with the principles
outlined in the EC Treaty, supported IHT's argument that IS GmbH had exhausted its
national trademark rights according to the EC Treaty. Id; see supra note 89 and accom-
panying text (describing role of Commission).
325. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2807, 51, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 875.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. For example, if IS GmbH had put its products into circulation in France
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The Commission conceded that a trademark assignor relin-
quishes control over goods carrying its trademark to the as-
signee."2 9 The Commission maintained, however, that the as-
signor nevertheless accepted the possibility that the assignee's
goods could be imported into the assignor's territory.35 0 Conse-
quently, the assignor, having indirectly put its product into circu-
lation and accepted a fee for the assignment, exhausts its trade-
mark right.3
3 1
ii. Gulmann's Answer
Advocate General Gulmann, rather than subscribing to one
of these views, declared the exhaustion principle inapplicable to
assignments. 3 2 The Advocate General stated that exhaustion
applies only to parallel rightholders, in separate Member States,
through a subsidiary rather than an assignment, it could ensure through its subsidiary
that goods carrying the 'Ideal Standard' mark in France were of adequate quality. See
Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2848, 37, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908. The fact that IS
GmbH would retain control over the goods through its subsidiary exhausts its rights.
Id. at 1-2848, 1 39, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908. The same is true if IS GmbH had trans-
ferred its trademark by means of a license, which would permit IS GmbH to control the
marked product through contractual provisions. Id.
An assignment does not give IS GmbH the opportunity to control the mark be-
cause trademark assignments do not contain restrictive clauses. Opinion of Advocate
General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2815, 83, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 882.
Because most trademark assignees are also acquiring the business represented by the
trademark, they would never accept that the assignor could retain control over the
marked products. Id. The Advocate General recognized this fact in his opinion:
However, it cannot be assumed that the assignor of the mark can, as the Com-
mission claims, retain control of the quality of the mark by including in the
contract of assignment conditions for revocation with a view to guaranteeing
the maintenance of a minimum quality. As the Commission itself has recog-
nized, an agreement to that effect would in fact be a license agreement. The
United Kingdom government in particular has pointed out that from a practi-
cal business point of view it is unrealistic to imagine that the assignee of a
trademark would accept continued control by the assignor. The contract of
assignment is chosen precisely so as to effect a complete assignment of the
rights connected with the mark.
Id. For these reasons IS GmbH argued that putting products into circulation through
assignments should be treated differently than doing so via licenses or subsidiaries. Id.
at 1-2815, 85, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 883.
329. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2812, 72, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 880.
330. Id.
331. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 42, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909.
332. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2807, 51, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 875.
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that are economically linked. 33 With an assignment, Gulmann
reasoned, exhaustion is irrelevant because the original proprie-
tor is not marketing the trademarked product in more than one
Member State. 334 However, because IS GmbH's decision to as-
sign its trademark eventually led to the circulation of the trade-
mark in more than one territory, Advocate General Gulmann
held IS GmbH responsible for the circulation. 3 5
c. Gulmann's Balancing Test: Proprietor's Responsibility
Versus Consumer Interest
Having declared the exhaustion principle inapplicable, Ad-
vocate General Gulmann balanced the responsibility of the pro-
prietor against the consumer interest.3 6 In upholding the Free
Movement of Goods principle,33 7 Gulmann addressed the fact
that IS GmbH made a voluntary decision to assign its trade-
mark. 3  Alternatively, Gulmann considered the possible detri-
mental effects to consumers if IS GmbH were denied the ability
to block IHT's imports. 339
i. Arguments of the Parties
In balancing the competing considerations of the proprie-
tor's conduct and consumers' interests, Gulmann first examined
IHT's argument, which was supported by the Commission. 4 °
The decisive factor, according to these two parties, was IS
GmbH's execution of a voluntary transaction as the proprie-
tor.3 4 ' The most important function of a trademark, argued IHT
and the Commission, is not to protect consumers, but to give the
proprietor the right to have the quality of its product accurately
represented.4 2 In the case of an assignment, where the proprie-
tor consents to use of the mark on other products, the trade-
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1-2835, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 901.
336. Id. at 1-2797, 15, 16, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 865.
337. See supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text (explaining Free Movement of
Goods).
338. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at I-
2797, 16, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 865.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1-2812, 1 71, 72, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 879-80.
341. Id. at 1-2812, 72, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 880.
342. Id. at 1-2812, 71, 72, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 879-80.
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mark's main function, therefore, is relinquished. 43 Conse-
quently, if trademark owners become aware that assignments
may eventually diminish the reputation of their marks, they will
become more careful in assigning their marks.344
Gulmann then addresses the arguments of IS GmbH, sup-
ported by both the German and UK Governments. 45 IS GmbH
argued that its right to assign freely its mark, without fear of sub-
standard imports carrying the mark, forms part of the specific
subject matter of its trademark right.346 Thus, even aside from
the consumer interest served by being able to block IHT's im-
ports, IS GmbH felt that its own proprietary rights in the trade-
mark entitled it to prevent the imports. 47
ii. Gulmann's Answer
In assessing the proprietary right, Gulmann dismissed IS
GmbH's view that free assignability forms a trademark's specific
subject matter.3 48 Gulmann stated that without free assignabil-
ity, a trademark nevertheless serves its purpose in helping the
proprietor establish a reputation for its products. 3 49 The mini-
mal restriction imposed on the proprietor by not guaranteeing
trademark protection after an assignment, Gulmann reasoned, is
outweighed by the EC Treaty mandate that goods flow freely
across national frontiers.350
.With respect to the consumer factor, Gulmann declared
that a trademark is not an absolute guarantee of quality to con-
sumers.3 5 ' Because a proprietor may, at any time, vary the qual-
ity of its product, Gulmann resolved that consumers are never
guaranteed that a mark represents a certain quality.3 52 Gulmann
further stated that, regardless of the scope of a trademark's guar-
343. Id. at 1-2812, 72, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 880.
344. Id. This would result in less confusion of brands for the public, thus serving
the consumer interest as well. Id.
345. Id. at 1-2815-20, 85-102, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 883-88.
346. Id. at 1-2815, 1 85, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 883.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1-2815, 86, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 883.
349. Id. at 1-2817, 94, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 885.
350. Id. at 1-2817, 1 95, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 885.
351. Id. at 1-2818, 1 98, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 886.
352. Id. The "so-called quality guarantee," states Gulmann, does not justify ob-
structing Free Movement of Goods. Id. at 1-2818, 2819, 98, 100, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at
886.
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antee to consumers, a trademark serves to protect its owner."' 3
While Gulmann conceded that a trademark's essential function
is to enable consumers to discern the quality of a product, he
stated that this function benefits mainly the proprietor.354
Based on this view of trademarks, as primarily supportive of
the proprietor, Gulmann concluded that Articles 30 through 36
prevented German trademark law from allowing IS GmbH to
block IHT's products.355  Gulmann did not recognize the in-
dependent consumer interest as a sufficient justification for the
proprietor's right to protect the distinguishing function of trade-
marks. 56 For Gulmann, this principle applies whether the
owner acquired the mark by a license, an assignment, or any
other contractual arrangement. 357
3. Judgment of the Court
In contrast to the Advocate General's balancing test, the
353. Id. at 1-2819-20, 1 101, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 887. Gulmann notes:
Irrespective of the fact that certain rules of trade mark law may have regard to
the interests of consumers, it may be concluded in view of the foregoing that
the rules which give the trade mark proprietor the opportunity to protect his
exclusive right by means of actions for infringement are not so intended. The
scope of the proprietor's exclusive right must not therefore be determined on
the basis of what is necessary for the protection of the consumer but only on
an assessment of whether it is necessary to protect the trade mark proprietor's
interest in the mark's performing its essential function of enabling consumers
to distinguish the product from those of a different origin without risk of con-
fusion.
Id.
354. Id. Gulmann asserted that national laws allow proprietors to protect their
trademark rights by suing for infringement. Id. He stated that, regardless of their ben-
eficial effects on consumers, these laws are intended to benefit the proprietor. Id.
Therefore, when determining the extent of these national rights under the EC Treaty,
the Court must consider the proprietor's interests and not those of the consumer. Id.
355. Id. at 1-2835, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 901.
356. Id. at 1-2828, 138, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 895.
357. Id. at 1-2835, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 901. Gulmann's conclusion reads as fol-
lows:
Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty preclude national legislation from al-
lowing an undertaking which is the proprietor of a trademark in a Member
State to oppose the importation from another Member State of similar prod-
ucts lawfully bearing in the latter State a mark which is identical or may be
confused with the protected mark, where the mark under which the disputed
products are imported originally belonged to a company affiliated to the un-
dertaking which is opposing the importation and was acquired by the new
proprietor by means of a contract concluded with the affiliated company.
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Court's opinion confronted the exhaustion doctrine.358 The
Court observed that because a trademark proprietor's assign-
ment does not afford the proprietor the opportunity to control
the goods bearing the assigned trademark, it does not constitute
consent within the meaning of exhaustion.359 In support of a
trademark owner's right to assign its mark for a particular Mem-
ber State, the Court examined the territorial nature of trade-
mark rights. 60
a. Territoriality and Independence of Trademarks
The Court stated that trademark rights are territorial, and
hence assignments of trademarks must be permitted by refer-
ence to a particular territory.361 IHT unsuccessfully argued that
IS GmbH should not be able to make a territorially limited as-
signment.362 If IS GmbH chose to assign its trademark, argued
IHT, it should have accepted that it was doing so for the whole
Community.363 The Court commented that trademarks in Eu-
rope are meant to form rights independently of one another in
different territories. 64
For support, the Court cited the Paris Union Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property,365 which provides that
a mark registered in one .signatory country is regarded as in-
358. See Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2847-48, 50, 11 34, 40, 43 [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. at 907, 909 (explaining that, due to proprietor's lack of control, consent to
assignment does not constitute consent within meaning of exhaustion doctrine).
359. Id.
360. See id. at 1-2843-46, 21-32, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 905-07 (focusing on terri-
torial nature and independence of trademarks).
361. Id. at 1-2851, 48, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 910. The Court focused extensively
on the territorial nature of national trademark rights. See id. at 1-2843-46, I 21-32,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 905-07 (devoting to territoriality section of opinion entitled "([t]he
territorial nature and independence of national trade-mark rights").
362. Id. at 1-2851, 47, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 910.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1-2844, 24, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 905.
365. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, Mar. 20,
1883, 25 Stat. 1372, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.IAS. No. 4931, as revised at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, 53 Stat. 1748, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.IAS. No. 6293, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (entered into
force on Apr. 26, 1970) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. Eleven nations signed the orig-
inal convention. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,
Mar. 20, 1883, 161 Consolidated Treaty Series 409 (providing original text of 1883 Paris
Convention between Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Salvador, Servia, Spain and Switzerland). Many more nations have since become
signatories. See TRADEMARs THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1051-52 (Anne Marie Greene
ed., 3d ed. 1982) (listing 94 parties to Paris Convention as of 1982).
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dependent of marks registered in other signatory countries. 66
According to the Court, therefore, trademarks may be assigned
in one country without being assigned in other countries. 367
The Court also found support in the Madrid Agreement Con-
cerning the International Registration of Marks, 68 which states
that assignments of marks may be made for either one or several
of the contracting countries.369
The Court noted an exception for arrangements in which
the territories of several states are joined into a single territory
366. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2844, 1 25, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 905-06 (cit-
ing Paris Convention, supra note 365. art. 6, 53 Stat. at 1777, 21 U.S.T. at 1639, 828
U.N.T.S. at 325). Article 6 of the Paris Convention states, in pertinent part:
A mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as
independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union, includ-
ing the country of origin.
Paris Convention, supra note 365, art. 6, 53 Stat. at 1777, 21 U.S.T. at 1639, 828 U.N.T.S.
at 325.
367. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2845, 1 26, [1994] 3'C.M.L.R. at 906. While
the Court concedes that some countries do not allow a trademark assignment without
an accompanying transfer of the business, the Court refers to Article 6 of the Paris
Convention, which states that the transfer of the accompanying business need only in-
clude that portion of the company located in the country. Id. at 1-2845, 28-29,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 906, (citing Paris Convention, supra note 365, art. 6, 53 Stat. at
1778, 21 U.S.T. at 1643, 828 U.N.T.S. at 329-31). The Paris Convention states as fol-
lows:
When, in accordance with the law of a country of the Union, the assign-
ment of a mark is valid only if it takes place at the same time as the transfer of
the business or goodwill to which the mark belongs, it shall suffice for the
recognition of such validity that the portion of the business or goodwill lo-
cated in that country be transferred to the assignee....
Paris Convention, supra note 365, art. 6, 53 Stat. at 1778, 21 U.S.T. at 1643, 828 U.N.T.S.
at 329-31.
368. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr.
14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement]. The Madrid Agreement
has provided a means for trademark owners to acquire simultaneous protection of their
marks in multiple foreign countries. See Roger E. Schechter, Facilitating Trademark Re-
gistration Abroad: The Implications of U.S. Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 25 GEo. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 419, 419 (1992). The protection afforded by the foreign country is
the same as if the mark had been filed directly in that country. Id. at 419-20 (citing
Madrid Agreement, supra, art. 4, 828 U.N.T.S. at 399). While the Madrid Agreement
itself confers no substantive rights, such rights are provided in the national protections
that emanate from the international registrations provided by the Madrid Agreement.
See Jeffrey M. Samuels, The Madrid Protocol and Trademark Harmonization, 387 PLI/PAT
231 (1994) (describing trademark rights conferred by Madrid Agreement).
369. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2845, 1 31, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 906, (citing
Madrid Agreement, supra note 368, art. 9, 828 U.N.T.S. at 409). See Madrid Agreement,
supra note 368, art. 9, 828 U.N.T.S. at 409 (referring to "the assignment of an interna-
tional mark in respect of one or several of the contracting countries").
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for the purposes of trademark law.37 ° The Uniform Benelux
Law,3 7' for instance, specifically prohibits the assignment of a
mark for one part of the joined territory.3 7  The Court noted
that, unlike the Uniform Benelux Law, Community trademark
law does not replace the laws of the Member States. 373 Commu-
nity trademark law, therefore, does not affect assignments of
trademarks that enjoy national territorial -protection. 74 A posi-
tive obligation on the part of the Member States to alter their
national laws to prohibit trademark assignments for only a part
of the Community, maintained the Court, would require specific
370. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2845, 32, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 906-07.
371. Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks of Jan. 1, 1971, Jan. 1, 1971, 704
U.N.T.S. 312. The Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks came into force as a result of
the Benelux Treaty on Trademarks of March 19, 1962. See Benelux Treaty on Trade-
marks of March 19, 1962, March 19, 1962, art. 1, 704 U.N.T.S. 301, 302-04 (requiring
contracting countries, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands, to implement Uniform
Benelux Law on Trademarks as national trademark laws). See supra note 247 (discuss-
ing Benelux Treaty on Trademarks).
372. Ideal Standard at 1-2845, 32, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 906-07. See Uniform
Benelux Law on Trademarks ofJan. 1, 1971, art. 11, 704 U.N.T.S. 312, 320. Article 11
provides, in relevant part:
The exclusive right to a trademark may, independently of the transfer of
all or part of the business, be transferred or licensed, for all or part of the
products for which the mark was registered.
The following shall be void:
2. assignments or other transfers which are not made for the entire
Benelux territory.
Id. (Author's translation from French).
373. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 2853-54, 56, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 911. See
EC Trademark Directive, supra note 52, O.J. L 40/1 at 1. The Directive provides for a
Community trademark which may be used concurrently with, but does not replace,
national trademark rights:
The Directive does not deprive the Member States of the right to continue to
protect trade marks acquired through use but takes them into account only in
regard to the relationship between them and the trade marks acquired by re-
gistration;
Whereas Member States also remain free to fix the provisions of proce-
dure concerning the registration, the revocation and the invalidity of trade
marks acquired by registration; whereas they can, for example, determine the
form of trade mark registration and invalidity procedures, decide whether ear-
lier rights should be invoked either in the registration procedure or in both
and, if they allow earlier rights to be invoked in the registration procedure,
have an opposition procedure or an ex officio examination procedure or both;
whereas Member States remain free to determine the effects of revocation or
invalidity of trade marks .... "
Id.
374. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 2853-54, 56, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 911.
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language in a directive or a regulation.
b. Does an Assignment Amount to Consent?
Unlike Advocate General Gulmann, the Court applied the
exhaustion analysis, assessing whether IS GmbH's territorially-
limited assignment fell within the specific subject matter of its
trademark right.376 The Court recited the rule that Article 36
only permits derogations to the Free Movement of Goods princi-
ple when the specific subject matter of the intellectual property
right is at stake.37" The Court cited Centrafarm v. Winthrop in re-
calling the specific subject matter of trademarks as being the ex-
clusive right to use the mark for the purpose of putting products
into circulation for the first time.378
The Court then evaluated IS GmbH's contention that con-
senting to a trademark assignment is not consent to putting
trademarked products into circulation within the exhaustion
doctrine.3 79 The Court observed that when a trademark is di-
vided, exhaustion occurs if the two separate trademark owners
are either the same or economically linked.38 0  Economic
linkage, according to the Court, includes a licensing arrange-
ment.3"' The licensor may control the quality of the licensee's
products by inserting contractual clauses requiring the licensee
to comply with specific instructions. 82
With an assignment, however, the proprietor relinquishes
control over the quality of the goods bearing its trademark. 83
The Court stated that for a proprietor to exhaust its national
375. Id. at 1-2854, 57-58, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 912.
376. Id. at 1-2846-51, 33-45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 907-10.
377. Id. at 1-2846, 1 33, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 907.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1-2849, 40, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909.
380. Id. at 1-2847-48, 1 34, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 907. For support the Court cites
the Hag II opinion, which states, "[f]or the trademark to be able to fulfil [its] role, it
must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the control
of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality." Id. at 1-2848, 1 37,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908 (citing Hagll, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3758,1 13, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R.
at 608).
381. Id. at 1-2848, 37, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908.
382. Id.
383. See Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.1L I-
2815, 1 83, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 882. Most firms assign their trademark in conjunction
with the transfer of part of their business to another firm. Id. With these assignments,
the assignees require that the assignor relinquish control over the quality of the goods
carrying the trademark. See id. (noting that, in situations where assignees acquire part
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trademark rights it must be able to exert some control over the
quality of the circulated goods.3 84 Without this control, the pro-
prietor's trademark could be affixed to products of substandard
quality, thereby devaluing the trademark. 85 Thus, while licens-
ing a trademark can exhaust the owner's right, an assignment
preserves the owner's trademark right.38 6 The proprietor may,
therefore, benefit from national trademark laws and may limit its
assignment to a particular territory.3 87
The Court rejected the argument, of IHT and the Commis-
sion that, by assigning its trademark, IS GmbH impliedly con-
sented to putting its trademark into circulation.388 The Court
responded that, because a trademark assignment does not give
the assignor control over the quality of products marketed by the
assignee, the assignor is not consenting to putting its own prod-
ucts into circulation. 389 The Court held that consent to as-
signing a trademark does not amount to the consent required to
exhaust national trademark rights."9 °
of business and accompanying trademark, assignee would never accept continued con-
trol by assignor over goods carrying mark).
384. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2849, 38, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908. See
Joliet, supra note 184, at 317. Before the Ideal Standard case came before the ECJ,Judge
Joliet expressed his views on how the Court should treat trademark assignments, based
largely on the lack of control over the trademarked goods:
In itself, an assignment is an operation carried out instantaneously which like-
wise does not provide the assignor with the means to influence the quality of
the goods produced by the assignee. Consequently, if a company which is the
proprietor of the trade mark in several Member States assigns its trade mark
for one of those States to another completely independent company, it must
be allowed to prevent, in the States in which it retains ownership of the trade
mark, the importation of goods produced by the assignee. Conversely, the
same right must be granted to the assignee. It would be otherwise if there
were economic links between the assignor and the assignee with the result that
they must be regarded as a single source, that is to say a manufacturing group
subject to single management.
Id.
385. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2849, 38, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908.
386. Id. at 1-2850, 1 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909.
387. Id. See supra notes 361-75 and accompanying text (outlining Court's discus-
sion of nature of trademarks as territorially limited form of intellectual property).
388. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 1 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909.
389. Id. Recall that assigning a trademark may result in that trademark later ap-.
pearing on a product of substandard quality, thus diminishing the reputation earned by
the original trademark owner. Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, Ideal Standard,
[1994] E.C.R. at 1-2815, 1 85, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909; see supra note 328 and accompa-
nying text (discussing lack of control in assignment of national trademark).
390. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909. See
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c. The Consumer Interest
The Court addressed the rights of consumers in terms of
the essential function of trademarks.3 91 The Court cited Hag II
for the proposition that, when considering the specific subject
matter of trademark rights, the scope of the proprietor's exclu-
sive trademark right must be determined with regard to the
mark's essential function. 9 2 The Court stated that deferring to
the Free Movement of Goods principle would undermine this
essential function.39 3 Consumers would no longer be able to
identify with certainty the origin or quality of trademarked
goods.394 Moreover, the trademark owner could be held ac-
countable for the poor quality of the goods for which it was not
responsible.393 The Court further noted that these considera-
tions apply whether the splitting of the trademark resulted from
a voluntary or involuntary assignment.3 96 While this distinguish-
ing function of trademarks was not the main focus of the Court's
analysis,397 the Court affirmed the importance of the consumer
Gerd F. Kunz, Waiting for Sirena II - Trademark Assignment in the Case Law of the European
Court ofJustice, 22 INT. REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 319, 326 (1991). Three years
before the Ideal Standard judgement, Kunz foreshadowed the Court's line of reasoning
when he contemplated the absurdity of equating a trademark assignment with consent:
"Consent" in such circumstances could mean that the proprietor of a
trademark by its assignment for part of the European Community has con-
sented to the use of this trademark by the assignee within the whole Commu-
nity (including territories in which the assignor has retained his trademark
ights).... In my opinion, it is absurd to assume that parties in the course of a
normal trademark assignment would have such intentions.
Id.
391. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850-51, 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10.
392. Id. at 1-2850, 1 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10 (citing HagII, [1990] E.C.R. at
1-3759, 1 16, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 608).
393. Id.
394. Id. See Kunz, supra note 390, at 327. With respect to preserving the interests
of consumers subsequent to a trademark assignment, Kunz states:
The products marketed by the new proprietor in the new countries are clearly
his products and can and will probably be different in quality and composition
from the products sold by the owner of the trademark in the old countries.
Consequently, it is in the interest of consumers that the owner of the trade-
mark in the old countries can object to parallel imports of products bearing
the trademark coming from the owner of the trademark in the new countries
and vice versa.
Id.
395. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10.
396. Id.
397. Compare id. at 1-2850, 11 45-46, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10 (devoting two
paragraphs to its consideration of "identifying function" or "essential function" of trade-
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oriented essential function of trademarks.3 98
III. IDEAL STANDARD: A COMMENDABLE DECISION, BUT A
MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO REVISIT THE UNIQUE
NATURE OF TRADEMARKS
The Court in Ideal Standard justly held that, due to a trade-
mark assignor's lack of control over the assignee's trademarked
products, a trademark assignment within the European Union
does not constitute exhaustion of national trademark rights.399
The Court thus modified its recently articulated consent doc-
trine with a thoughtful, practical standard based on control.4 °°
The Court, however, should have more clearly articulated this
new standard. And, more importantly, the Court failed to state
whether the requirement of control applies only to trademarks
or equally to all forms of intellectual property. 40' Companies
and legal practitioners, therefore, are left wondering whether a
patent or copyright assignment would exhaust their rights. In
view of the unique consumer function of trademarks,40 2 the ECJ
should have expressly limited its control doctrine to trademarks,
apart from other forms of intellectual property.
A. The Court's New Definition of Consent is Confusing
In adding its requirement of control for the exhaustion of
trademark rights, the Court clung to the terminology of the con-
sent doctrine recently articulated in Hag II.4°3 In Ideal Standard,
marks) with id. at 1-2846-51, 33-45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 907-10 (using 13 paragraphs
to apply exhaustion of rights analysis) and id. at 1-2843-46, 91 21-32, (1994] 3 C.M.L.R.
at 905-07 (devoting 12 paragraphs to territorial nature of trademarks).
398. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10.
399. Id. at 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857.
400. Id. at 1-2849, 38, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908. See supra notes 379-90 and ac-
companying text (explaining ECJ's new principle stating that consent for exhaustion
purposes requires that trademark proprietor maintain control over goods).
401. See Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (failing to state
whether control standard applies beyond trademarks, to other forms of intellectual
property).
402. See supra notes 51-74 and accompanying text (tracing historical development
of trademarks and development of consumer function).
403. See supra notes 379-90. The Court, in Ideal Standard, explained that consent
to putting goods into circulation for the first time, for exhaustion purposes, requires
that the trademark proprietor have control over the trademarked products. Id. See also
notes 263-67 and accompanying text (describing doctrine of consent as articulated in
Hag II).
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the Court redefined the term "consent," stating that, due to a
lack of control, consent to an assignment is not the consent re-
quired for exhaustion.404 This new, narrow definition of consent
is confusing because it unnecessarily departs from the common
meaning of the word "consent."
The Court could have stated, alternatively, that a trademark
assignor does indeed consent to the marketing of his products.
The Court could then have expressly recognized that the con-
sent doctrine is no longer adequate for trademark cases and that
it must be supplemented with the requirement of control.
Therefore, exhaustion of trademark rights would require both
consent and control over the mark.4 °5 Consequently, while a
trademark assignor does consent to the circulation of its marked
goods within the European Union, it nevertheless retains its na-
tional rights due to its lack of control over those goods. The
Court, however, rather than admit that its consent doctrine was
no longer adequate, simply changed the meaning of "consent"
to require control over trademarked goods.4 °6 While the legal
effect is the same either way, the Court could have framed its
analysis less confusingly.
B. The Control Standard Should Apply Only to Trademarks
The Court's requirement of control for exhaustion pur-
poses should be limited to trademarks. The Court did not ex-
pressly confine its control requirement to trademarks and it
failed to distinguish trademarks from other forms of intellectual
property.40 7 Evidence of the unique nature of trademarks can
be found in their consumer function, in their historical develop-
404. See supra note 390 and accompanying text (articulating Court's new definition
of consent).
405. See Ideal Standard, [ 1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909. As
explained above, rather than create a new requirement in addition to consent, the
Court chose to narrow the definition of consent. Id. The legal effect is the same either
way: the new element of control is required. Id.
Conceptually, adding a new requirement seems more simple than reworking the
meaning of an established doctrine. Id. Perhaps the Court chose the latter because it
would have found it embarrassing to the admit that its consent doctrine, which it had
recently introduced in Hag II, was not sufficient. Id. Now, in Ideal Standard, the con-
sent doctrine still suffices because it incorporates the control requirement. Id.
406. Id.
407. See Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (neglecting to
state whether control standard applies beyond trademarks).
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ment,4° 8 in prior ECJ decisions, 0 9 and in EC legislation.4 10 Such
characteristics are absent from patents and copyrights. 4 1
1. Only Trademarks Have a Consumer Function
Because consumers depend upon trademarks to represent a
certain quality, the Court aptly requires control for the exhaus-
tion of national trademark rights. 112 The consumers' positive
perceptions generated by a trademark constitute the good-will
value of the trademark.4 13 If a trademark owner is deemed to
have exhausted its national rights by making an assignment, the
consuming public could be betrayed by unexpectedly poor qual-
ity imports bearing the mark.414 This is because the original
trademark proprietor had no means of controlling the goods
carrying the assigned trademark.4"5 The inferior goods not only
confuse consumers as to the quality represented by the trade-
mark, but they also undermine the trademark's good-will value
upon which the original proprietor depends to sell his prod-
ucts.
4 1 6
408. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text (tracing development of trade-
marks beyond mere proprietary right to guaranty of quality to consumers).
409. See supra notes 220-39 and accompanying text (describing essential function
of trademarks).
410. See supra note 373 (referring to EC Trademark Directive).
411. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text (defining and explaining pur-
poses of patents and copyrights).
412. See supra notes 65-74 (detailing how trademarks came to represent quality
guaranty to consumers).
413. See supra note 71 (defining good-will of trademark).
414. See supra note 394 and accompanying text (noting that, in Ideal Standard, the
Court pointed out that, without national trademark rights, assignment would result in
consumers being betrayed by substandard goods produced by unknown companies).
415. See Tritton, supra note 19, at 425. As for intellectual property other than
trademarks, considerations of control over the manufacture of products are irrelevant.
Id. When patents and copyrights are assigned, as opposed to trademarks, there is no
likelihood of the public being deceived. Id.
416. See supra note 385 and accompanying text (referring to Court's statement in
Ideal Standard that, if free movement of goods were to prevail over national trademark
rights, trademark owners would be held accountable for substandard goods of other
manufacturers). Even when applying the control principle purely from an intellectual
property owner's point of view, it appears that trademarks are the only form of intellec-
tual property meriting the control requirement. Unlike a trademark owner, a patent or
copyright owner is not concerned that his assignment will result in the marketing of
inferior products under its patent or copyright. Since patents and copyrights represent
original creations with inherent value, assignees will not alter the quality of the pat-
ented or copyrighted product. Therefore, a patent or copyright assignor, by making
the assignment, puts his product into circulation knowing that if it is eventually im-
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Unlike trademarks, other forms of intellectual property sus-
tain artistic and creative values that inhere in the patents and
copyrights issued for their protection.417 Whereas the informa-
tion protected by patents and copyrights help to define prod-
ucts, 418 trademarks affix good-will to products placed in the mar-
ket.4 19 Trademarks also retain a purpose different from both
copyrights and patents. Consisting of a name or label, trade-
marks communicate verifiable features to distinguish different
products. 4"0 By contrast, patents and copyrights protect unique
characteristics but do not supply that communicative element.4 21
Consumers, therefore, do not rely on a patent or copyright to
identify a product's quality in the same way they rely on a trade-
mark.
The ECJ need not require that patent and copyright owners
retain control over their products before their national rights
are exhausted because an assignment of the patent or copyright
will not diminish the value of the patent or copyright in the
hands of the assignee. If a national patent owner, for example,
assigns its patent, thereby relinquishing control over products
employing the patent, consumers of those goods will neverthe-
less benefit from the innovations of the patent. Unlike with
trademarks, there will be no substandard goods carrying the pat-
ported back into his territory, it will have remained unchanged. See supra note 385 and
accompanying text (implying that parties should be able to assign their national trade-
marks due to unique control requirements of trademarks).
A trademark proprietor, on the other hand, fears that its mark may end up on a
substandard product. This is obviously damaging to the trademark owner's reputation.
Therefore, while trademark owners are entitled to use national intellectual property
rights to block substandard imports carrying their mark, copyright and patent owners
should not be afforded the same luxury. See supra note 385 and accompanying text
(referring to control requirement for trademarks).
417. See supra notes 34-50 (discussing how patents protect inventions, and copy-
rights create rights for literary or artistic works). A trademark, which consists of a name
or label, requires comparatively little creative effort. See supra notes 51-54 (defining
trademarks and distinguishing them from copyrights and patents).
418. See supra notes 34-50 (outlining protections afforded by patents and copy-
rights).
419. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (defining good-will and citing
examples of increasing importance of good-will function for trademarks).
420. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (stating that a trademark is a
name or label allowing consumers to distinguish between products).
421. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (stating that patents protect in-
ventions to encourage manufacture of new works that will benefit society); see also supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text (explaining that copyrights encourage production
of new literary and artistic creations).
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ent because the patent itself dictates the quality of the goods.42
The same is true of copyrights.
2. Historically, Europe Has Recognized the Unique Nature
of Trademarks
The value of trademarks has evolved beyond the mere indi-
cation of origin of a product.4 23 As the Industrial Revolution
spurred the growth of business and advertising, the public devel-
oped a reliance on trademarks as a guarantee of quality.4 24 Dur-
ing the same period, the Paris Convention and the Madrid
Agreement recognized the territorial nature of trademarks.42 5
These conventions provided that, because trademarks were un-
derstood by reference to a particular territory, they could be as-
signed for particular countries. These provisions implicitly ac-
knowledged the public's reliance on trademarks and the possi-
bility of consumer confusion if identical trademarks were affixed
to products of varying quality within the same territory.
3. The ECJ's Essential Function Principle Acknowledges the
Unique Nature of Trademarks ,
More recently, the ECJ has recognized the consumer func-
tion of trademarks through its principle of essential function.42 6
In the repackaging cases,427 the Court evaluated a trademark's
essential function in deciding whether to limit national trade-
422. See supra note 394 and accompanying text (noting that trademarks, on other
hand, may be affixed to goods of varying quality).
423. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text (outlining evolution of trade-
marks, from ancient proprietary mark to modern corporate asset); see also supra notes
65-67 and accompanying text (describing changing role of trademarks in sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries).
424. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (citing England's Industrial
Revolution as reason for trademark's increasing function as quality guaranty to consum-
ers); supra note 55 and accompanying text (setting forth dual function of trademarks).
425. See supra notes 365-69 and accompanying text (referring to provisions of Paris
Convention and Madrid Agreement stating that trademarks assignments may be made
for single nations).
426. See Hoffman LaRoche, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (stating that
scope of trademark proprietor's national trademark right must be defined not only by
specific subject matter but also by essential function of trademark); Centrafarm v. AHP,
[1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 (discussing consumer oriented essential
function of trademarks).
427. See supra notes 220-39 and accompanying text (detailing facts and signifi-
cance of Hoffman LaRoche and Centrafarm v. AHP, which address application of national
trademark rights after repackaging and importation of goods).
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mark rights.4 28  Unlike other forms of intellectual property,
trademarks primarily enable consumers to distinguish between
products of varying quality.4 29 Denying a party national trade-
mark protection, therefore, requires that the party could control
the quality of the goods carrying its trademark.4"' Otherwise,
the Court would appear ignorant of the essential function of
trademarks.43 '
The essential function principle contradicted the Court's
previous language in Sirena v. Eda, in which the Court declared
that trademarks deserved less protection than other forms of in-
tellectual property.43 2 The Advocate General in Sirena explained
that trademarks neither require creative effort nor contribute as
much to society as do patents or copyrights.433 The Court held
428. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (stating that Court, in evaluating
scope of trademark proprietor's rights, went beyond specific subject matter analysis,
and considered essential function of trademark).
429. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (describing ECJ's definition of es-
sential function of trademark as guaranty to consumers of origin of product).
While the essential function of trademarks has been defined by the ECJ as guaran-
teeing the origin of products, it really is a guarantee of quality. See supra notes 65-70
and accompanying text (noting that trademarks are no longer meant to indicate origin
of products, and that guarantee of quality is what consumers look for in trademarks).
The assigning and licensing of trademarks among various companies, for example,
means that a trademark may not indicate the actual origin of a product. It should,
however, guarantee the quality of the product. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying
text (observing that modem usage of trademarks indicates quality).
It is likely that the Court continues to use the word "origin," rather than "quality,"
simply out of habit. See, e.g., supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (tracing ancient,
traditional view of trademarks as indicator of origin of goods). One may assume, there-
fore, that when the Court refers to the consumer-oriented essential function of a trade-
mark, it is referring to a guarantee of quality, and not origin. See supra notes 220-39 and
accompanying text (discussing ECJ's essential function principle).
430. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (reciting holding of Ideal Standard
that, for trademark owner to exhaust national rights, it must have possibility of control
over circulated goods).
431. See supra notes 391-98 (relaying Court's observation, in Ideal Standard, that
denying trademark assignor national trademark rights would confuse consumers, thus
undermining trademark's essential function).
Note that the Court states that consumers would be confused as to the origin of the
goods. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2850, 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10. As
explained above, the Court should realize that, in fact, consumers would be confused as
to the quality of the goods. See supra note 429 (arguing that terminology of ECJ's essen-
tial function principle is outdated, and should be changed to reflect quality variation in
goods).
432. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing view of trademarks set
forth by Court and Advocate General in Sirena).
433. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (noting that the Advocate Gen-
eral compared the societal contribution of the 'Prep' trademark to that of penicillin).
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that any agreement, including an assignment, exhausted na-
tional trademark rights.4" 4
The Sirena decision failed to recognize that trademarks con-
tain something which cannot be found in patents and trade-
marks: a guarantee of quality to consumers. 43 5 Trademarked
products can create consumer confusion if not controlled by
one entity.4 3 6 Patents and copyrights do not present this same
danger.43 7 The Court's essential function principle recognizes
this distinction.
Despite the Court's inherent reliance a trademark's con-
sumer oriented essential function in Ideal Standard, the Court
made only cursory mention of it.43 9 The Court's holding, how-
ever, clearly benefits consumers. 4° With the control standard,
the Court explicitly emphasized the proprietor's need to main-
tain the quality of goods linked with his trademark, and implic-
itly recognized the consumer's need to depend on the quality
that a mark represents. The importance of control, therefore,
stems from both the proprietor's fear of substandard products
carrying his mark441 and the possibility of different quality goods
This seems like an unfair comparison, because the invention of penicillin, a medical
breakthrough, surely contributed much more to society than most other patented in-
ventions. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (citing positive contribution of
penicillin).
434. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (reciting Court's statement that
Sirena's use of national trademark laws, combined with assignments and licenses, vio-
lated EC Treaty).
435. See Sirena v. Eda, [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260 (failing to recognize
quality guaranty of trademarks).
436. See supra note 394 and accompanying text (describing how consumers may be
betrayed by trademark due to unexpected substandard quality goods bearing trade-
mark).
437. See supra notes 417-22 and accompanying text (explaining that, since patents
and copyrights do not guaranty quality of product to public, they are less likely to
deceive consumers).
438. See supra notes 220-39 and accompanying text (detailing Court's application
of essential function principle to trademarks, but not to other forms of intellectual
property).
439. See Ideal Standard at 1-2850, 45, 46, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 909-10. The ECJ
devoted but two paragraphs to essential function. Id. The Court did not mention the
consumer function of trademarks in its exhaustion analysis. See id. at 1-2846-51, 1 33-
45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 907-10 (failing to consider essential function of trademarks in
exhaustion analysis of trademark assignment).
440. See supra notes and accompanying text 391-98 (discussing Court's adherence
to interests of consumers in Ideal Standard opinion).
441. See supra note 385 and accompanying text (explaining that, without national
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being offered to consumers under the same mark.442
4. EC Trademark Legislation Reflects the Unique Nature
of Trademarks,.,
In recent legislation regarding Community-wide trade-
marks, the Council expressly recognized the distinct consumer
function of trademarks. 44" The Council's Trademark Directive
and recent Regulation provide that, for Community marks, ex-
haustion must consider not only consent but also the possibility
of consumer confusion.444 The Regulation permits a trademark
owner to prevent the importation of goods under his mark, even
if he has consented to their circulation, if the quality of the
goods has been altered." 5 The Regulation therefore takes into
account possible harm to consumers, regardless of the proprie-
tor's consent.
446
C. Practical Implications of the Ideal Standard Decision
Despite some oversights in the ECJ's analysis, the Court's
trademark rights, trademark owner risks having to compete with identically marked
products of lesser quality due to lack of control over goods).
442. See supra note 394 and accompanying text (observing that, if assignments
were to exhaust national trademark rights, consumers would no longer be able to iden-
tify origin of goods).
443. See EC Trademark Directive, supra note 52, art. 7, O.J. L 40/1, at 5 (1988)
(providing that, despite consent to circulation of goods, trademark proprietor may op-
pose further importation of goods where condition of goods is changed or impaired);
Council Regulation No. 40/94, art. 13, O.J. L 11/1, at 6 (1994) [hereinafter EC Trade-
mark Regulation] (employing language virtually identical to that of EC Trademark Di-
rective's Article 7).
444. EC Trademark Directive, supra note 52, art. 7, O.J. L 40/1, at 5 (1988); EC
Trademark Regulation, supra note 443, art. 13, O.J. L 11/1, at 6 (1994). The section of
the Regulation dealing with exhaustion, which closely resembles that of the Directive,
provides:
1. A Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its
use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community
under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for
the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially
where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been
put on the market.
EC Trademark Regulation, supra note 443, art. 13, O.J. L 11/1, at 6 (1994). In Para-
graph 2, the Council recognizes the possibility of consumers being deceived by similar
trademarks affixed to goods of varying quality. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
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final decision in Ideal Standard should be applauded for its prac-
tical benefits. Had the Court alternatively decided that a trade-
mark assignment exhausts national trademark rights, it would
have discouraged trademark owners from assigning their marks
within the European Union. Trademark owners seeking to as-
sign their trademark would face the risk of having to compete
with cheaper, substandard imports bearing their trademark.44"
Consequently, they would refuse to assign their mark, or do so
only in return for much higher fees.
Because trademark assignments are often made in conjunc-
tion with the sale of a company,"' holding that an assignment
exhausts trademark rights would limit corporate acquisition ac-
tivity in the European Union." 9 A trademark's good-will often
represents a substantial portion of a company's assets. 450 If as-
signing trademark rights meant exhausting those rights, how-
ever, an EU company which transferred its business and trade-
mark to another firm would suffer a reduction in the good-will
value of its trademark, due to the possibility of substandard
products carrying the trademark. 4 1  This would leave the
purchasing company, as the assignee of the mark, with a greatly
devalued trademark. Consequently, EU companies would be de-
terred from engaging in otherwise efficient corporate acquisi-
45i2tions.
447. See supra note 385 and accompanying text (discussing prospect of trademark's
devaluation if assignments resulted in exhaustion of national trademark rights).
448. See supra note 383 (citing Advocate General Gulmann's observation that
trademarks are often assigned concurrently with the sale of business).
449. See supra note 383 (noting that issue of whether trademark assignment ex-
hausts national trademark rights has important consequences for companies depend-
ing heavily on reputation of their trademarks). Assignees acquiring another company
and its accompanying trademark generally require that the assignor relinquish control
over the quality of the goods carrying the trademark. See supra note 383 (referring to
Advocate General Gulman's explanation of standard practice of corporate trademark
assignees).
Therefore, trademark assignors must be able to protect themselves against the im-
portation, into their national territory, of substandard goods bearing the trademark.
Without this protection, firms would be discouraged from assigning trademarks concur-
rent with the transfer of their business. This, in turn, would discourage firms from
selling their business. See supra note 383 (emphasizing importance of control over
trademark for firms selling their business and assigning their trademark).
450. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (citing presence of trademarks
on corporate balance sheets and increasing value of trademarks to companies).
451. See supra note 385 and accompanying text (explaining possible devaluation of
trademark due to poor quality goods carrying trademark).
452. See Brian V. Mullany, How M & A is Reshaping Europe's Industrial Landscape,
1996] 1253
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CONCLUSION
The commercial evolution of trademarks and the European
Union's recognition of the consumer function of trademarks
suggest that the ECJ should develop a set of doctrines expressly
tailored to national trademark rights apart from other forms of
intellectual property. The Ideal Standard decision is a partial step
in this direction because it allows a trademark owner to assign
his mark while retaining his national trademark rights and pre-
serving consumer reliance on trademarks. To take the full step,
however, the ECJ must limit its control doctrine to trademarks
and explain how trademarks are different from patents and
copyrights. In doing so, the ECJ would create a legal environ-
ment that more effectively serves the purposes of national intel-
lectual property rights. This would provide the business and
legal communities with clearer guidance as to the limits of their
national intellectual property rights.
MERGFRS & AcQuISITIONS, Jan. 1, 1992. During the 1980's, corporate restructuring in
Europe, in the form of labor-shedding measures, reduced cost inefficiencies and im-
proved productivity. Id. The next wave of restructuring, in the early 1990's, took the
form of corporate mergers and acquisitions. Id. Cross-border acquisitions and mergers
of domestic firms aimed at cutting costs and providing the means to compete with non-
European competitors. Id. In the United States, during the merger wave of the 1980's,
mergers were a means of curing management incompetence. Should Congress Stem the
Rising Tide of Takeovers?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1985, at Business, 5. An active merger
market was seen as beneficial to the economy because it shifted corporate assets from
poor managers to more efficient ones. Id.
